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It Is Lawyers We Are Funding:
A Constitutional Challenge to the 1996
Restrictions on the Legal Services Corporation

Jessica A. Roth*

Introduction
In the summer of 1996, Congress enacted a series of restrictions on
the Legal Services Corporation ("LSC") 1 to prevent recipients of LSC
funds ftom engaging in political action. 2 The restrictions prohibit LSC
recipients from supporting litigation aimed at redistricting, 3 at influencing
or challenging any executive order or agency action at any level of government,4 or at encouraging individuals to participate in political activity. 5
LSC recipients are also prohibited from participating in any litigation with
respect to abortion; 6 assisting any persons incarcerated in federal, state,
or local prison; 7 assisting any illegal aliens; 8 and assisting any person
charged with the illegal sale or use of drugs in a proceeding seeking to
evict them from public housing. 9 In addition, LSC recipients may not seek
to reform any federal or state welfare system through litigation, lobbying,
or rulemaking; 10 participate in any class actions; 11 sue the Legal Services
Corporation; 12 or request attorneys' fees, even where provided for by
• Law clerk to the Honorable Denise Cote, Southern District of New York. A.B.,
Harvard College, 1992; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1997. The author wishes to thank Burt
Neuborne and Frederick Schauer for their advice and encouragement.
1 A national legal services program was first created in 1965 as part of the Economic
Opportunity Act of 1964. See generally Warren E. George, Development of the Legal
Services Corporation, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 681, 682 (1976). The Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974 is the governing statute of the LSC. Pub. L. No. 93-355, 88 Stat. 378
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1994)).
2 The restrictions were incorporated into the appropriations bill, the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996 ("OCRAA''), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110
Stat. 1321.
3 See OCRAA § 504(a)(l).
4 See id. § 504(a)(2).
5 See id. § 504(a)(l2).
6 See id. § 504(a)(l4).
1 See id. § 504(a)(l5).
s See id. § 504(a)(l l).
9 See id. § 504(a)(l7).
10 See id. § 504(a)(l6).
11 See id. § 504(a)(7).
12 See id. § 506.
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federal or state law. 13 These restrictions, as originally enacted, applied not
only to the use of LSC funds, but also to funds received from any other
source. 14
Although the LSC mandate has never been free of restrictions, 15 the
1996 amendments represent Congress's most comprehensive effort to date
to remove disfavored subjects from the purview of LSC lawyers. Enacted
after a heated debate between supporters and opponents of the LSC in
Congress, 16 the restrictions have been described as a compromise between
those who would eliminate the Corporation entirely due to its "liberal"
bent and those who would save it at all costs. 17 Despite the new restrictions, 18 many LSC lawyers and their supporters breathed a sigh of relief
at their narrow escape from total "de-funding." Just as LSC recipients
have historically been reluctant to challenge the legality of the restrictions
imposed on them, 19 today's LSC lawyers and supporters have largely
1

3See id. § 504(a)(l3).
See id. § 504(d)(l). In response to several court rulings finding the restriction on
non-federal funds constitutionally suspect, the LSC revised its regulations concerning the
use of non-federal funds . See 45 C.F.R. § 1610 (1996) (permitting LSC grantees to use
non-federal funds for prohibited activities provided that the funds and facilities used to
undertake these activities are segregated from federal funds).
15 The first LSC statute prohibited recipients from engaging in litigation relating to
abortion, desegregation, selective service and military desertion cases, and criminal
proceedings. Participation in class actions was only permitted if the individual lawyers
received approval from their program superiors. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996(f)(b)(7)-(10)
(1994). See generally Note, Depoliticizing Legal Aid: A Constitutional Analysis of the
Legal Services Corporation Act, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 734, 736-39 (1976) . The 1974
statute also placed severe restrictions on the ability of LSC lawyers to engage in political
activities on their own time as well as in their representative capacities, and forbade LSC
offices from becoming involved in any form of political organizing or lobbying efforts.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2996(f)(a)(6)(A), (e)(b)(5) (1994).
16 See 142 CONG. REC. H81490-550, H81590-92 (daily ed. July 23, 1996).
17 See David E. Rovella, Legal Aid Lawyers Roll Dice with New Lawsuit, NAT' L L.J.,
Feb. 19, 1997, at A6 (describing Ken Boehm, former counsel to the LSC board, as
characterizing the outcome as "a deal with moderate congressional Republicans last
summer, allowing the new funding restrictions in exchange for a smaller LSC budget
reduction ... [t]here really was a quid pro quo ....").
18 The LSC budget was cut to $278 million in 1996, a one-third reduction from its
previous budget. See David E. Rovella, Will Court Win Spur GOP Backlash ?, NAT'L L.J.,
Jan. 13, 1997, at Al.
19 In the over two decades since the LSC was created, the majority of the restrictions
imposed on funding recipients, including the bans on abortion and desegregation cases,
have never been challenged. See Note, The Constitutionality of Excluding Desegregation
from the Legal Services Program, 84 CoLUM. L. REv. 1630, 1630 (1984). One notable
exception to this general reluctance to bring suit is the 1991 challenge to the redistricting
restrictions brought in Texas Rural Legal Aid Inc., v. Legal Servs. Corp. , 940 F.2d 685
(D.C. Cir. 1991) ("TRLA" ). In TRLA, although the plaintiff LSC lawyers argued that the
LSC had exceeded its authority by prohibiting redistricting litigation and that the regulations violated their First Amendment rights, the District Court and the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia reached only the former issue. The court found the LSC to
be within its statutory authority. See id. The other exception to the reluctance trend was
brought in 1975 immediately after the LSC's creation. The suit challenged one of the
original restrictions that prohibited LSC employees from participating in, or encouraging
14
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declined to challenge the most recent restrictions. Faced with the choice
between limited funding and no funding at all, the cautious view rationally counsels against upsetting Congress and jeopardizing the future existence of the LSC. 20
A few renegade LSC lawyers have resisted this view. Convinced that
the "LSC is caving into budgetary blackmail,"21 and that "it's better to
hang than to compromise,"22 these lawyers challenge the assumption that
the so-called "compromise" represented by the restrictions will ultimately
save the Corporation. 23 These lawyers have taken the LSC to court. 24 In
three lawsuits filed nationally, the lawyers have challenged the restrictions
on First Amendment grounds of free speech and association, and Fifth
Amendment grounds of equal protection and due process. 25 Thus far, the
lawsuits have had varying degrees of success. One state court held the
class action restriction to be flatly unconstitutional under the First Amendment as applied to non-federal funds. 26 A federal court found specific
others to participate in, public demonstrations, boycotts, or strikes, on the grounds that
the restriction violated the First and Fifth Amendment rights of the LSC grantees, the
lawyers, and their clients. See Welfare Rights Org. v. Cramton, Civil No. 75-1938 (D.D.C.,
filed Nov. 20, 1975) (unpublished material) cited in Note, supra note 15, at 737 n.17.
20 Outgoing LSC President Alexander D. Forger observed of Burt Neuborne, the NYU
law professor who is representing several LSC lawyers challenging the restrictions, "[he]
has the luxury of playing Russian roulette," while LSC officials must face the reality of
total defunding. Rovella, supra note 18, at Al. See also David E. Rovella, LSC Invites
Law Firms to the Legal Services Game, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 27, 1997, at AS ("The LSC has
scolded grantees for thumbing their noses at Congress by continuing to pursue class
actions."); Rovella, supra note 17, at A6 (quoting Ken Boehm, former LSC counsel, as
saying, if those currently challenging the restrictions "are successful with this lawsuit, they
will pull the rug out from under their supporters in Congress").
21 Rovella, supra note 17, at A6.
22 Rovella, supra note 18, at Al.
23 Valerie J. Bogart, one of the lawyers who has challenged the restrictions, argues
that "placating LSC opponents is pointless, since 'no understanding exists' between the
LSC and Republicans who seek the agency's elimination. '[The LSC] keeps saying there
is a contract with Congress . . . . There is no contract. The first thing out of this new
Congress will be to zero us out."' Id.
24 The three lawsuits that have been filed are: Varshavsky v. Geller, No. 40767/91 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Dec. 24, 1996); Legal Aid Soc'y of Haw. v. Legal Servs. Corp., Civil No. 97-00032
(D. Hawaii Feb. 14, 1997); Velasquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., Civil No. 97-00182 (E.D.N.Y.
Jan. 14, 1997).
25 The Varshavsky case challenged the restrictions on the additional ground that they
conflicted with the New York State Code of Professional Responsibility. The case was
framed as a conditional motion to withdraw by Valerie Bogart, the LSC lawyer who had
served as counsel for a certified plaintiff class in a class action against the New York
Department of Social Services. Following a preliminary injunction against the Department
of Social Services, Ms. Bogart had been involved in monitoring the Department's compliance. She asked the court to clarify whether the new LSC restrictions required her to
withdraw from her involvement in that case. Ms. Bogart argued that she should not be
required to withdraw, even if the regulations required it, on account of the fact that the
regulations were void because they violated the U.S. Constitution and the Code of
Professional Responsibility. See Varshavsky, No. 40767/91, slip op. at 2-3.
26 See id. at 20-21, holding sections 504(a)(7) (class actions) and 504(d)(l) (applica-
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restrictions, although not the class action restriction, to be unconstitutional as applied to non-federal funds. 27 The third case is still pending in
district court.
This Article provides support for the argument, not yet made in court,
that those restrictions that can be described as political, i.e., those prohibiting class actions and any type of political reform effort, are unconstitutional even as applied to the use of federal funds. This argument is a
difficult one to make in light of the Supreme Court's statement in Rust v.
Sullivan 28 that the government may fund only those activities, including
speech, which it supports. It also may be a politically imprudent argument
to advance, since a legal victory on this basis of this argument could result
in the total elimination of the Legal Services Corporation. Nevertheless,
the argument is legally sound and is an important one to make from a
moral and political standpoint. While Congress may choose not to fund
legal services at all, 29 in choosing which legal activities to fund, it may
not discriminate between legal activities based on their political import.
Drawing on one of the exceptions that the Court itself carved out in Rust,
namely, that the existence of a public subsidy does not justify restrictions
on speech in areas expressly dedicated to speech activity or the suppression of dangerous ideas, this Article argues that the LSC restrictions in
fact target dangerous ideas within a program expressly dedicated to First
Amendment activity.
Part I demonstrates that the types of litigation and political activities
prohibited by the LSC restrictions are protected by the First Amendment,
and that the restrictions constitute impermissible content discrimination.
Part II uses a public forum analysis to argue that in creating the LSC,
Congress dedicated funds to classic First Amendment activity. Accordingly, any restrictions on the use of funds for particular activities cannot
be inconsistent with the program's designated purposes. Part III demonstrates that the restrictions also violate the equal protection component of
the Due Process Clause. Although the poor are not a suspect class for the
purposes of equal protection analysis, the regulations are nevertheless
unconstitutional because they are motivated by invidious bias. In addition,

tion to non-federal funds) are unconstitutional (but without reaching whether section
504(a)(7) was unconstitutional as applied only to federal funds).
27 See Legal Aid Soc'y of Haw., No. 97-00032, slip op. at 35-36, holding the following
provisions of the 1996 Legal Services Corporation Act unconstitutional: § 504(a)(l) (redistricting); § 504(a)(2) (influence of executive orders or agency action); § 504(a)(3) (influence
of adjudicatory proceeding) ; § 504(a)(4) (comprehensive ban on lobbying); § 504(a)(l2)
(political organizing or educational activities); § 504(a)(14) (abortion); § 504(a)(15) (representation of prisoners); § 504(a)(l 7) (representation of drug defendants in public housing
evictions).
28 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
29 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that there is no right to counsel in civil
cases . See M.L.B . v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 562 (1996); Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174,
2181 (1996); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) .
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they impair the LSC beneficiaries' fundamental right of access to the
courts and consequently their ability to participate fully in and enjoy the
protections of our democratic institutions.

I. The LSC Restrictions Violate the First Amendment
A. Litigation Is First Amendment Activity
1. NAACP v. Button
The Supreme Court consistently has held that litigation is protected
activity under the First Amendment. In NAACP v. Button, 30 Virginia sought
to enforce a statute regulating solicitation in the legal business against the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) .
The Court found the statute unconstitutional as applied to the NAACP,
despite the fact that Virginia had a legitimate interest in regulating abuses
in the legal profession. Recognizing the special role that litigation played
"[i]n the context of NAACP objectives," 31 the Court held that litigation,
and especially group litigation, could be "a form of political expression" 32
for those groups, like the black community in the South, "which find
themselves unable to achieve their goals through the ballot ...." 33 For
them, the Court reasoned, "litigation is not a technique of resolving
private differences; it is a means for achieving the lawful objectives of
equality of treatment by all government, federal, state, and local, for the
members of the Negro community in this country." 34
The Court refused to define precisely where in the penumbra of rights
protected by the First Amendment the activities practiced by the NAACP
fell. Rather, Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, found that the NAACP
activities "whereby Negroes seek through lawful means to achieve legitimate political ends," 35 could not be subsumed under any one "narrow,
literal conception of freedom of speech, petition or assembly." 36 However
categorized, such litigation was entitled to the highest level of protection. 37 Under the current system of government, as Justice Brennan saw
it, not only was litigation potentially the only practical avenue available
for a minority to petition for redress of grievances, 38 but it was also the
most effective way to communicate "the distinctive contribution of a
30 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
3 1 /d. at 429.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Button , 371 U.S . at 430.
36 Id.
37 See id. at 433.
38 See id.
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minority group to the ideas and beliefs of our society." 39 Thus, from the
standpoint of concerns about political participation and equality, as well
as about the richness of the marketplace of ideas and the legitimacy of
our political democracy-both integral to our understanding of the purposes of the First Amendment40-the Virginia statute was destructive of
constitutional values.
2. Beyond Button
In numerous cases since Button, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed
and expanded its central holding that litigation is protected by the First
Amendment. In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia, 41 United
Mine Workers of America v. Illinois State Bar Association,42 and United
Transportation Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 43 the Court found, respectively, First Amendment protection for a railroad workers' union's attempt
to provide its members with legal referrals for personal injury suits; a
miners' union's effort to hire an attorney on a salaried basis to assist
members with workmen's compensation claims; and a transportation union's attempt to secure competent counsel at reasonable fees for its members pursuing claims under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Restating the principle that had emerged from the collective action cases following
Button, Justice Black wrote for the Court in United Transportation Union:
"[t]he common thread running through our decisions in NAACP v. Button,
Trainmen, and United Mine Workers is that collective activity undertaken
to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right within
the protection of the First Amendment." 44
Whereas Button, viewed narrowly, may have suggested that only
litigation undertaken specifically for a political purpose was entitled to
First Amendment protection, the union cases that followed made clear that
litigation undertaken for any purpose was protected. As the Court stated
in Trainmen, "[t]he Brotherhood's activities fall just as clearly within the
protection of the First Amendment [as the activities at issue in Button]
.... [T]he Constitution protects the associational rights of the members
of the union precisely as it does those of the NAACP." 45 In fact, the
39

Id.

°Kenneth L.

Karst has described three purposes, "not always distinct in practice,"
which are commonly identified as central to the First Amendment as follows : "(I) to
permit informed choices by citizens in a self-governing democracy, (2) to aid in the search
for truth, and (3) to permit each person to develop and exercise his or her capacities, thus
promoting the sense of individual self-worth." Kenneth L. Karst, Equality and the First
Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV . 20, 23 (1975).
41
377 U.S. 1 (1964).
42 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
43 401 U.S. 576 (1971).
44 Id. at 585.
45 Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen , 377 U.S. I, at 8.
4
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majority in Trainmen specifically rejected the dissent's view that the vital
fact about Button was that litigation "was a 'form of political expression'
to secure, through court action, constitutionally protected civil rights." 46
Where no such civil rights were at issue, as in Trainmen, the dissent
argued Button was "not apposite." 47 Again, in United Mine Workers, the
Court clarified, "the First Amendment does not protect speech and assembly only to the extent it can be characterized as political. 'Great secular
causes, with small ones, are guarded."' 48
In re Primus49 reiterated the Button holding in a case more closely
analogous to Button's original facts. In Primus, the Court extended First
Amendment protection to a South Carolina lawyer who had solicited a
prospective litigant for representation by the ACLU. Finding that "the
ACLU's policy of requesting an award of counsel fees does not take this
case outside of the protection of Button," 50 the Court held that the ACLU,
like the NAACP, engaged in litigation as "'a form of political expression'
and 'political association."' 51 As in Button, the lawyer's actions on behalf
of the ACLU were found to be protected. While states may regulate
lawyers' activities, the Court held, they may do so only with "narrow
specificity." 52 Moreover, the Court emphasized that the most exacting
scrutiny should be applied to limitations on core First Amendment rights. 53
Because South Carolina's action in punishing the ACLU lawyer failed
such strict scrutiny, it was held unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.54
3. Group versus Individual Litigation
Button and its progeny established that group litigation, whether undertaken for overtly political reasons or merely to secure more meaningful
access to the courts, is protected by the First Amendment. Class actions,
the most recent procedural device invented to bring group litigation, 55 fall
within the protections of Button. Insofar as litigation always involves
Id. at 10 (Clark, J., dissenting).
Id.
48 United Mine Workers of Am. v. Ill. State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967)
(quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945)).
49 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
50 Id. at 429.
51 Id. at 428 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429, 431 (1963)).
52 Primus, 436 U.S. at 433 (quoting Button, 371 U.S. at 433).
53 See Primus, 436 U.S. at 432 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. l, 44-45 (1976)).
54 Primus, 436 U.S. at 439.
55 Class actions, as defined by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, did not exist prior
to the revision of the federal rules in 1966. Prior to the 1966 revision, claims in which
many persons were interested could be brought under Federal Equity Rule 38, which dated
to 1912. Federal Equity Rule 38 provided: "When the question is one of common or
general interest to many persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the whole."
46

41
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association and speech between the lawyer and his or her client, individual cases are also covered by the large shadow cast by Button. As demonstrated by the cases following Button, which involved actions taken one
at a time on behalf of individual clients, one need not petition the court
as a member of a group in order to enjoy the protections of the First
Amendment. While First Amendment concerns may be at their zenith
where an oppressed minority joins in asserting a political claim, these
concerns are nevertheless present even when an individual litigant advances a small, non-political cause.
B. The Restrictions Constitute Impermissible Content Discrimination

1. Content-Based Discrimination against Speech Is Impermissible
a. The Classic Statement: Mosley and Core Political Speech
In the hierarchy of speech contemplated by the First Amendment,
political speech "occupies the highest, most protected position."56 Although
the outer limits of political speech are imprecise, 57 if there is one broad
category that is always considered political, it is speech overtly addressing
government policy or the acts of particular public officials. 58
JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, FEDERAL EQUITY RULES (8th ed. 1933), quoted in Arthur R. Miller,
Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class Action
Problem," 92 HARV. L. REY. 664, 669 n.24 (1979).
56 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 422 (1991) (Stevens, J., concurring) .
Commercial speech and nonobscene, sexually explicit speech are regarded as a sort of
second-class expression. Finally, "obscenity and fighting words," fill out the lowest tier,
receiving "the least protection of all." Id.
57 See generally Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils
of an Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REY. 1 (1990) (discussing
the Court's attempts to define "matters of public concern").
Speech that does not overtly touch on government policy, but rather expresses a particular
world view or perspective on people and events, is also frequently considered political speech.
For example, art is often political in the sense that it implicitly critiques certain policies or
offers alternative perspectives. Speech concerning race and religion is frequently political as
well, in the sense that views on these subjects inform views about how society should be
structured. The line defining where art, for example, turns into obscenity (or where it ceases
to be mere entertainment and takes on a political hue), and where expressions on race
cross over into fighting words, is inexact. The Court therefore has tended to overestimate
the political value of speech, affording it more protection than it may warrant according
to a more literal interpretation of "political" speech. See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333
U.S. 507, 510 (1948) ("The line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive
for the protection of that basic right. Everyone is familiar with instances of propaganda
through fiction. What is one man ' s amusement, teaches another's doctrine."). See also
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (recognizing the political value of even
indecent parodies of public figures); FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); cf Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (finding certain pornographic brochures sufficiently
lacking in "literary, artistic, political, or scientific value" to warrant regulation).
58 See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (invoking our nation's
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Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley 59 posed the question of
whether a city could single out one type of political speech, peaceful labor
picketing, for exclusion from a general ban on picketing within 150 feet
of any school. The Supreme Court held that it could not. The distinction
made by the City of Chicago, in the Court's view, represented the very
essence of content discrimination: it impermissibly privileged one subject
area of speech-labor disputes-over other subject areas of speech, such
as racial discrimination. Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, invoked
both the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
First Amendment in his classic formulation of the general prohibition
against content discrimination:
[G]ovemment may not grant the use of a forum to people whose
views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to
express less favored or more controversial views . . . . There is
an "equality of status in the field of ideas," and government must
afford all points of view an equal opportunity to be heard. 60
The Court has applied Mosley in other contexts to hold that a rule
prohibiting any discussion of matters of public policy or politics may
constitute impermissible content discrimination. In Consolidated Edison
v. Public Service Commission of New York, 61 the Supreme Court held that
New York's Public Service Commission could not suppress bill inserts
discussing controversial issues of public policy. Reiterating its view that
"the First Amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends not
only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of
public discussion of an entire topic," 62 the Court invalidated the Commission's action. Although the utility's bill inserts could be regulated pursuant to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions that were neutral as
to content, the Court found that the Commission's stated rationale 63 did
not justify the restrictions. The Court found that the Commission had
"profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials"). See also
R.A.V., 505 U.S. 377, 421 ("Speech about public officials or matters of public concern
receives greater protection than speech about other topics."); FCC v. League of Women
Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
59 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
60 Id. at 96 (quoting ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE, 27 (1948)).
61 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
62 Id. at 537.
63 The Commission argued that it was concerned that allowing the inserts would:
(I) force Consolidated Edison's views on a captive audience; (2) prevent the allocation of
limited resources in a way better designed to serve the public interest; and (3) force the
ratepayers to subsidize the cost of the insert. See id. at 540-41.
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singled out "certain bill inserts precisely because they address controversial issues of public policy" 64 and that this restriction on the free speech
of private parties 65 was not narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest.
In Boos v. Barry, 66 the Court similarly held that a local ordinance
prohibiting the display of signs critical of foreign governments near their
embassies constituted impermissible content · discrimination. Observing
that the ordinance "operates at the core of the First Amendment by
prohibiting petitioners from engaging in classically political speech,"67 the
Court determined that the ordinance was suspect because it kept an "entire
category of speech"68 off the streets. Because this ordinance, like the one
in Consolidated Edison, was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
government interest, it was struck down. Mosley, Consolidated Edison,
and Boos thus stand for the proposition that a regulation that singles out
political speech for prohibition is highly suspect. For the regulation to be
sustained in either the public forum context of the streets, such as in
Mosley or Boos, or the private context, such as in Consolidated Edison,
the state must present a compelling interest justifying the restriction. It
must further demonstrate that the restriction is narrowly tailored to serve
that interest. 69

b. The Recent Statement: R.A.V. and Hate Speech
Even when the content of speech is not protected by the First Amendment,70 the Supreme Court has long held that the state cannot discriminate
Id. at 537.
Although Consolidated Edison is a regulated utility, the Court found that it was a
private party for the purposes of First Amendment analysis, and that the bills sent by the
utility represented private, commercial speech. See id. at 534 n. l; see also id. at 539-40
("Consolidated Edison has not asked to use the offices of the Commission as a forum from
which to promulgate its views. Rather, it seeks merely to utilize its own billing envelopes
to promulgate its views on controversial issues of public policy."). See Part 11.B.3, infra,
for an extensive discussion of the significance of the nature of the forum.
66 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
67 /d. at 318.
68 Id. at 319.
69 There have been occasional narrow exceptions to the general prohibition against
subject-matter prohibitions. In Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), cited by
the Court in Consolidated Edison, the Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting any political
advertising on public buses. There, the Court found that the city's stated interests-"fears
that partisan advertisements might jeopardize long-term commercial revenue, that commuters would be subjected to political propaganda, and that acceptance of particular
political advertisements might lead to charges of favoritism," Consolidated Edison, 447
U.S. 530, 539-were sufficiently compelling and that the rule was sufficiently narrowly
tailored.
70 The Supreme Court has historically held that a few select areas of speech are "not
within the area of constitutionally protected speech" because they are "of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
64

65

1998]

A Challenge to the 1996 LSC Restrictions

117

between speakers based on the content of their speech. 71 In R.A. V. v. City
of St. Paul, 72 one of the most recent statements of this rule, the Supreme
Court invalidated a local ordinance making bias-motivated disorderly conduct
a crime subject to more severe punishment than "ordinary" disorderly conduct.
The Court accepted the Minnesota Supreme Court's finding that the ordinance reached only "'fighting words' within the meaning of Chaplinsky," 73
and that the speech was therefore proscribable. Nevertheless, the Court found
the ordinance "facially unconstitutional in that it prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses." 74
Although the types of expressive conduct forbidden by the ordinance
(such as placing a swastika or a burning cross on public or private property) 75
could have been prohibited under more general trespass or disorderly
conduct laws, the Court was disturbed by the fact that only speech associated with specific subjects and certain viewpoints was singled out for
the prohibition. 76 Those wishing "to use 'fighting words' in connection
with other ideas-to express hostility, for example, on the basis of political affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality," 77 were not penalized, while those wishing to express themselves, albeit virulently, on the
subject of "race, color, creed, religion, or gender" 78 were. However noble
the city's motives, the Court concluded that "the First Amendment does
not permit St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on those speakers who
express views on disfavored subjects."79

outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377, at 383 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity) and
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S . 568 (1942) (fighting words)). See also Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (defamation). While these areas are sometimes
described as "unprotected" by the First Amendment, the Court has also taken pains to
point out that they are not "invisible" to it. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 383. Thus, while these
types of speech may "be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content
... they may [not] be made the vehicles for content discrimination unrelated to their
distinctively proscribable content." R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 383-84.
71 See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S . 92 (1972). See generally Geoffrey
R. Stone, Content Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46 (1987); Geoffrey R. Stone,
Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARYL. REV. 189 (1983); Susan
H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615
(1991).
72 505 U.S. 377 (1991).
73 Id. at 381 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942))
(establishing fighting words doctrine and defining fighting words as "those which by their
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace").
74 R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 381.
75 See id. at 380, describing the St. Paul ordinance, ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE
§ 292.02 (1990).
76 505 U.S. at 391 ("[T]he ordinance goes even beyond mere content discrimination,
to actual viewpoint discrimination.").
77 Jd.
1s Id.
19 Id.
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Within the subjects covered by the ordinance, Justice Scalia, writing
for the plurality, found that one viewpoint, espousing white supremacy,80
was handicapped. While displays containing some words-odious racial
epithets-for example, would be prohibited to proponents of all views,
fighting words not invoking race, color, creed, religion, or gender-casting aspersions upon a person's mother, for example-seemingly would be
usable ad libitum in the placards of those arguing in favor of racial
tolerance and equality. 81 Yet, such fighting words could not be used by
those speakers' opponents.82 Justice Scalia concluded that this scheme
impermissibly "license[d] one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while
requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules." 83 The St.
Paul ordinance thus went beyond mere subject discrimination to the more
insidious viewpoint discrimination, privileging the proponents of tolerance over those unimpressed with its virtues.

2. The LSC Restrictions Constitute Subject Matter as well as
Viewpoint Discrimination
a. The Restrictions Discriminate against All Political Speech
Taken as a whole, the restrictions on LSC recipients enacted in 1996 are
far broader than the restrictions on political speech presented in Mosley or
Boos. The LSC restrictions prevent recipients from engaging in any First
Amendment activity touching on political matters. LSC recipients, regardless
of the subject matter, may no longer participate in class actions 84 or petition
local or federal agencies for a change in administrative rules. 85 They may
not counsel individual clients to participate on their own in political
activity nor may they advocate a particular public policy.86 The restrictions, in short, seek to remove the LSC entirely from the political arena.
The members of Congress who passed these restrictions were quite
purposeful about this result. As one proponent of LSC stated, seeking to
appease his more conservative colleagues, "the following restrictions are
in place: No class action suits by LSC, no lobbying, no legal assistance
to illegal aliens, no political activities, no prisoner litigation, no redistricting litigation, no representation of people evicted from public housing due
to drugs. That's all in the past." 87 The LSC that emerged from the 1996
80 See

id. at 392.
id. at 391.
82 R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 391.
83 Id. at 392.
84 See OCRAA § 504(a)(7).
85 See id. § 504(a)(16).
86 See id. § 504(a)(l 2).
87 142 CONG . REC. H8149-04,8180 (daily ed. July 23, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Ramstad) .
8 1 See
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budget debate was self-consciously stripped of its ability to participate in
any such political activities. It was reduced to doing "ham and eggs work
for poor people," not the "sexier lawsuit . . . the class action suits ...
that draw headlines." 88
Regardless of the motive of Congress, 89 the restrictions on the LSC
clearly fall within the paradigm of political subject matter discrimination
prohibited by Mosley, Consolidated Edison, and Boos. The fact that the
subject matter they restrict is so broad-i.e., all political speech-does
not weaken the discriminatory nature of the prohibition. As in Consolidated Edison, where the prohibition applied to all controversial issues of
public policy, the breadth of the prohibition only heightens the pressure
on the government to advance a compelling interest served by such a rule.
b. The Restrictions Handicap a Particular Political Viewpoint
In addition to prohibiting all political activities, the LSC restrictions
particularly handicap the political viewpoint generally associated with the
population served by LSC recipients-the poor. If the poor and those who
advocate their interests have a particular political viewpoint, it is arguably
one that supports a more generous welfare state. This view has been typed
"liberal" in the contemporary political debate, contrasted with the "conservative"
view that advocates smaller government and less redistri butive taxation. 90
The viewpoint of the poor is not necessarily limited to advocating for
greater government largesse, however. The agenda pursued by legal advocates for the poor may rather be one seeking to hold the government
accountable for infringements of substantive rights already afforded by
law. This goal, like the goal of increasing poor people's substantive rights,
may be described as seeking political change from a non-responsive status
quo 91 to a state wherein the government lives up to its obligations. This
is not, however, equivalent to a change in the underlying law.
88

See id.
See discussion infra Part III.A.
90 See 142 CONG. REC. H8149-O4,8182 (daily ed. July 23, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Weldon) ("I have in front of me a whole list . . . of examples of where Legal Services
Corporation attorneys are engaging in left-wing liberal advocacy and in many cases going
exactly against the will of the people."). Senator Helms expressed a similar view of the
LSC in his comments during the 1995 budget debate, describing LSC lawyers as "a cadre
of liberal lawyers [who] push their social policies down the throats of local governments
and citizens." 141 CONG. REC. S8948 (daily ed. June 22, 1995) (statement of Sen. Helms).
Representative Doolittle stated "the reason a lot of members want to keep [the LSC] is
because it is an advocacy group for liberal causes." 142 CONG. REC. H8149-04,8181
(statement of Rep. Doolittle).
91 In his dissenting opinion in Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S . 788 (1985), Justice
Blackmun implicitly recognized that an "anti-status quo" viewpoint was a viewpoint for
the purposes of a First Amendment content discrimination analysis. Because advocacy
groups such as the NAACP were kept out of a Combined Federal Campaign Fund available
to federal workers, Justice Blackmun concluded, "employees may hear only from those
89
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One member of Congress understood "some apartment owners, some
growers, [and] some government officials" 92 to fear this viewpoint "because they do not want to afford the rights that the law gives." 93 The belief
that government and employers should be held accountable for their violations of law is a "viewpoint" that is fundamentally threatening to those
in power. It is a viewpoint generally associated with the population served
by the LSC, by virtue of the fact that they are poor and often receive
government assistance that is less than satisfactory.
While this viewpoint may be widely shared by advocates for the poor,
it is not limited to that population. Numerous groups over time have
advocated the view that government should live up to its promises to its
own citizens. As Harry Kalven wrote of the civil rights era, the efforts of
the NAACP in the 1950s and 1960s were best characterized as "a strategy
to trap democracy in its own decencies." 94 Although the civil rights movement ultimately resulted in a change in the substantive law represented
by the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, the early stages of the movement focused on litigation that
would "bring[] to light" the rights of blacks that "in an important sense
were always there." 95 The women's movement similarly used a strategy
of targeted litigation to improve the enforcement of women's rights. By
bringing well-timed cases under existing law, 96 the advocates of women's
equality created a "forced feeding of legal growth," and accelerated the
evolution of "legal doctrine defining [their] rights." 97

charities that think that charitable goals can best be achieved within the confines of
existing social policy and the status quo. The distinction is blatantly viewpoint based ... ."
Id. at 833 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court has also found white supremacy
to constitute a viewpoint for the purposes of First Amendment analysis. See supra text
accompanying notes 80-82; R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). It has also held that
a religious viewpoint is a viewpoint against which the state may not discriminate. See
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2517 (1995)
("Religion may be a vast area of inquiry, but it also provides . . . a specific premise, a
perspective, a standpoint from which a variety of subjects may be discussed and considered."). If perspectives as broad and amorphous as "white supremacy" and "religion" may
be described as viewpoints, "anti-status quo" is arguably a viewpoint as well.
92 142 CONG. REC. H8149-04,8183 (statement of Rep. Berman).
93 Id.
94 HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 67 ( 1965).
95 Id. While many of the most significant advances were made through targeted
litigation, the civil rights movement also utilized other legally protected means to advance
its cause. The sit-ins and marches staged throughout the South strategically invoked
numerous constitutional rights, albeit in a defensive posture, and often forced courts to
assert their protected status as well. See, e.g. , Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961)
(holding that participants in lunch counter sit-ins were protected by First and Fourteenth
Amendments).
96 See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Weinberger v. Wisenfeld, 420 U.S.
636 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971).
97 KALVEN, supra note 94, at 66-67 . Kalven originated this concept in the context of
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The LSC restrictions handicap a viewpoint that, like its predecessors in
the civil rights and women's rights movements, petitions the government
for change. Whether it leads LSC recipients to ask for a change in the
substantive law, as prohibited by the restrictions on lobbying, or a change
in the application or interpretation of existing law, as prohibited indirectly
by the restrictions on class actions, this viewpoint challenges government
officials to respect their clients and to honor the law. It is a viewpoint that
public officials, ranging from Social Security Administration employers
to members of Congress, would often rather not hear. It is the kind of
classically unpopular, dissident viewpoint that government officials have
historically attempted to suppress, 98 and that the First Amendment was
designed to protect.
As the Supreme Court recognized in New York Times v. Sullivan, 99
the First Amendment "was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people ... that government may be responsive to the will of the people
and that changes may be obtained by lawful means." 100 The constituency
to whom the government must be responsive includes those holding minority viewpoints. If the government could silence speakers critical of its
policies and the status quo, this nation would not have "uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open" 101 debate to which it has been nearly perfectly
committed since its founding.

the civil rights movement. It is, however, equally applicable to the women's civil rights
movement.
98 The Sedition Act of 1798 represents the most egregious attempt in our national
history by Congress to insulate itself from criticism. The Act made it a criminal offense
to:
write, print, utter or publish . . . any false scandalous and malicious writings
against the government of the United States or either House of the Congress ...
or the President . . . with intent to defame the said government . .. or to bring
them .. . into contempt, or disrepute; or to excite against them . . . the hatred of
the good people of the United States . .. .
1 Stat. 596 (1798), cited in KALVEN, supra note 94, at 17. The act expired by its own
terms two years after its enactment. Although the constitutionality of the Sedition Act was
never tested, "the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history." New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 275 (1964). As analyzed by Harry Kalven, the
Sedition Act was remarkable because it represents the only time the United States has had
a Jaw creating a crime of seditious libel against the government. KALVEN, supra note 94,
at 17. The existence of such a Jaw is significant, according to Professor Kalven, because
a "free society is one in which you cannot defame the government." Id. at 16. Thus, to
the extent that the LSC restrictions represent an attempt by Congress to tread down this
road once again, they are in poor historical company.
99 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
100 Id. at 269 (internal citations omitted).
101 Id. at 270.
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Viewed in light of Button and the subsequent litigation cases, R.A. V.,
Mosley, Consolidated Edison, Boos, and New York Times, the LSC restrictions should be regarded with suspicion. As in Consolidated Edison, the
restrictions remove all political subjects from the permissible range of
speech activities by LSC grantees. As in R.A. V., they handicap one particular, unpopular viewpoint. The LSC restrictions thus constitute both
subject matter and viewpoint discrimination. Moreover, in light of New
York Times, the restrictions should be viewed with particularly heightened
suspicion because the viewpoint singled out for suppression is one that is
critical of government.
The LSC's federal funding, however, places this case in a unique
context. The speakers at issue are not classically private speakers as they
were in Button, Mosley, Consolidated Edison, Boos, and New York Times.
Rather, the government here is in the position of funding the speech it
seeks to regulate. While LSC recipients in specific instances retain the
characteristics of private entities, in the context of the use of federal
funds, they are subject to regulation by Congress. Recognizing the Supreme Court's announcement in Rust v. Sullivan 102 that as a general rule
"the Government may choose not to subsidize speech,'' 103 the following
Part will explain why, according to its own terms, Rust should not apply
to the LSC case.
II. Rust v. Sullivan Distinguished
A. The General Rule and the Implied Exceptions

In Rust v. Sullivan, several recipients of family planning funds under
Title X of the Public Health Services Act challenged regulations prohibiting Title X recipients from engaging in abortion counseling, referral, and
activities advocating abortion as a method of family planning. The recipients argued that the regulations constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination by privileging an anti-abortion viewpoint over a pro-abortion
viewpoint in the context of family planning. They also argued that the
regulations impaired a woman's constitutional right to seek an abortion
under Roe v. Wade, 104 and that they impermissibly infringed on the doctor-patient relationship.
The Supreme Court rejected all of these arguments. Citing its previous decisions in Regan v. Taxation with Representation 105 ("TWR") and
102 500

U.S. 173 (1991).
/d. at 200.
104410 U.S. 113 (1973).
10 5 461 U.S. 540 (1983). In TWR, the Court upheld a statute granting a tax exemption
for lobbying activities undertaken by veterans' organizations, but not for lobbying activities undertaken by other nonprofit organizations.
103
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Maher v. Roe, 106 the Court found that the government does not engage in
impermissible viewpoint discrimination when it "selectively fund[s] a
program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public
interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program which
seeks to deal with the problem in another way." 107 By casting the provision of abortion services as an activity rather than a viewpoint, the Court
found that there was no viewpoint discrimination. Once the issue was
framed in such a manner, the distinction embodied in the regulations
could be seen as representing not viewpoint discrimination, but instead
the government's choice "to fund one activity to the exclusion of the
other." 108
Viewed as a choice between activities, the government's decision to
fund all family planning services other than abortion was thus removed
entirely from the paradigm of content discrimination and the protection
of the First Amendment. 109 The Title X recipients' other claims were then
easily dismissed as well, for, as the Court held in TWR, "a legislature's
decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not
infringe the right, and thus is not subject to strict scrutiny." 110 The woman's
right to choose an abortion was therefore not infringed by the government's refusal to fund it. 111
The Court also declined to find that the Title X recipients' right to
speak about abortion was infringed by the regulations. Because the regulations allowed recipients to use non-federal funds to support the excluded
services (provided that the facilities and personnel used to pursue them
were kept separate) the government had not foreclosed the participants'
ability to exercise their constitutional rights. 112 The fact that the recipients
would have to go outside of the program to advocate personal or professional views inconsistent with the goals of the program did not trouble
the Court. The Court reasoned that Congress, in creating the Title X
program, had not "expressly dedicated [an area] to speech activity," 113 nor
106 432 U.S. 464 (1977). In Maher, the Court upheld a state welfare regulation
authorizing payment for services related to childbirth but not for non-therapeutic abortions.
1o7 Rust, 500 U.S. at 193.
10s 1d.
109 As the Court explained the crucial interpretive device in its analysis, "we have here
not the case of a general law singling out a disfavored group on the basis of speech content,
but a case of the Government refusing to fund activities, including speech ...." Id. at
194-95.
110 TWR, 461 U.S. at 549.
111 See also Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S . 490 (1989), cited
approvingly by the Court in Rust, on this point (holding that the government need not
remove any obstacles to the exercise of a fundamental right that are not of its own making).
112 See Rust, 500 U.S. at 196 ("The Secretary's regulations do not force the Title X
grantee to give up abortion-related speech; they merely require that the grantee keep such
activities separate and distinct from Title X activities.").
113 /d. at 200 (quoting United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726 (1990)).
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preempted an area "traditionally open to the public for expressive activity." 114 In short, because family planning could not be described as fundamentally a First Amendment activity, the restrictions, including any
incidental burdens on speech, were permissible.
Finally, the Court held that the doctor-patient relationship was not
unduly intruded upon by the regulations because the Title X program did
not create the expectation of comprehensive medical services in the area
of family planning. Reviewing the program's legislative history, the Court
found that abortion services could reasonably be viewed as beyond the
"scope of the project funded" 115 and could be excluded on that basis.
According to the Court, the regulations were justified because they were
consistent with the statute authorizing the Title X program, 116 and because
patients should have been on notice that the care they received was subject
to Congressional limitations. 117
B. The Exceptions Applied to the LSC Case

Although Rust announced a rule of considerable import to all funding
cases, its rule is not iron-clad. The Court acknowledged that even though
the petitioners' constitutional arguments did "not carry the day" in Rust,
they nevertheless were not "without some force ."' 18 Had the facts of the
case been different in any of several enumerated ways, the Court recognized that its decision might have come out differently.
As suggested by the foregoing analysis of the Court's reasoning, the
outcome may have been different if the regulations had been found to
target disfavored speech rather than activities; if they had not allowed the
recipients of Title X funding to engage in the prohibited activities, including speech, through the use of non-federal funds; or if the restrictions
were not reasonably related to the scope and nature of the federal program, as seen through the eyes of the program's authorizers and its
beneficiaries. Most importantly, Rust might have been decided differently
if the Court had found that the family planning program was expressly
dedicated to First Amendment activity.
The following section explores the significance of these implied exceptions for the LSC case. Specifically, this section focuses on the distinction between regulations inherently targeting the expressive content of
speech rather than its non-expressive element and the nature of the federal
program.
114 Rust,
115

500 U.S. at 200.

/d. at 195.

116 See

id. at 187.
See id. at 200.
118 Rust, 500 U.S. at 191.
117
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1. First Amendment Activity Rather than Ordinary Conduct
In Rust, the Court emphasized that this was not "a case of the Government suppressing a dangerous idea, but of a prohibition on a project
grantee or its employees from engaging in activities outside of the project's scope." 119 If the distinction between those activities funded by the
program and those excluded was fundamentally based on the content of
speech, the Court would have taken more seriously TWR's admonition
that it "would be different if Congress were to discriminate invidiously
in its subsidies in such a way as to 'ai[m] at the suppression of dangerous
ideas."' 120 If it had viewed the case through this lens, the Court would
have been forced to consider whether the regulations' distinction between
abortion and non-abortion related speech was at all "like distinctions
based on race or national origin." 121 In other words, the Court would have
confronted the question recurring throughout its First Amendment jurisprudence: whether the distinction affected by the law was impermissibly
based on the content of First Amendment activity.
If the regulations primarily target First Amendment activity, Rust, as
well as the Court's expressive conduct cases, 122 suggests that they should
be subjected to strict scrutiny, especially if they target "dangerous ideas."
If they represent a choice by Congress to fund only select activities, and
thereby incidentally burden speech related to excluded activities, then
they fall under Rust's permissive standard. 123
In United States v. 0 'Brien, 124 the Court designed a four-part test to
determine whether regulations permissibly burden speech where speech
11 9 Rust,

500 U.S. at 194 (internal quotation marks omitted).
TWR, 461 U.S. at 548 (quoting Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S . 498, 513
(1959)).
12 1 Id.
122 See, e.g. , Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S . 288 (1984)
(upholding a National Park Service regulation prohibiting sleeping in public parks even
as applied to individuals protesting the plight of the homeless); United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding the conviction of an individual who burned his draft card
despite the possibly expressive nature of the act). Cf Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S.
58 (1970) (invalidating the conviction of an individual who engaged in the unauthorized
use of a military uniform in a theatrical production tending to discredit the armed forces);
Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S . 503 (1969) (invalidating
suspension of high school students who wore black armbands to protest the Vietnam War);
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (striking down a statute punishing those who
expressed their opposition to organized government by displaying any "flag, banner, or
device").
123 Laurence H. Tribe has described these different types of regulations as falling into
two "tracks." Regulations that primarily target expressive activity follow "track l," and
should be subject to heightened scrutiny. Those that incidentally burden speech follow
"track 2" and are subject to the more permissive standard established in O'Brien and
reformulated in Rust. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 12-2,
at 791-92 (2d ed. 1988).
124 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
120

126
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and non-speech elements are combined. First, the regulation must be
promulgated pursuant to a legitimate state power; 125 second, the regulation
must advance an "important or substantial governmental interest"; 126 third,
that interest must be "unrelated to the suppression of free expression"; 127
and fourth, "the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [must be] no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest." 128 If these conditions are met, the Court has held that "when
'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of
conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the
nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment
freedoms." 129
Thus, Button notwithstanding, the government could assert that the
LSC restrictions were constitutionally permissible because they serve an
important, content-neutral governmental interest (in balancing the budget) 130
that Congress may regulate pursuant to its spending power. 131 Although
the fourth part of the O'Brien test suggests that the restriction must be
narrowly tailored to serve that interest, Rust suggests that the standard of
tailoring is lower where the government funds the speech activity. Nevertheless, a significant lack of fit may imply that the government's real
interest is not what it represents, 132 but is in fact the direct suppression of
speech.
Part LB of this Article suggested that the regulations are not in fact
aimed primarily at the non-speech aspect of litigation and political activity. Rather, they purposefully target the expressive content of the proscribed activities. The legislative history of the regulations reveals Congress's unmistakable intent to eradicate the influence of "liberal" lawyers.
It does not manifest a concern for such ex post rationales as reducing
frivolous litigation or the wasting of funds. As Representative Burton
complained during the Congressional debate over LSC funding,
The LSC is fighting the welfare reform plan in Wisconsin .
even though this Congress and the President of the United States
125

See id. at 377.

126 Id.
121

Id.

128 Id.
129 Id.

at 376.
infra Part III discussing the government's current defenses of the LSC
restrictions.
131 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (granting Congress the power to provide for the
general welfare); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (granting Congress power to make all laws
necessary and proper to execute that power).
132 See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 812 (1985) (holding that the
underinclusiveness of the restriction in that case "cast[s] doubt on [the] genuineness" of
the government's asserted motive).
130 See
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... support it. Why are taxpayers' dollars being used to fight the
very things we think are important? . . . The right thing to do is
protect the people of this country and get rid of the Legal
Services Corporation. 133
Moreover, the regulations are both grossly underinclusive and overinclusive to effectively address any purpose other than the suppression of
disfavored speech.13 4 Although, in O'Brien, the Court stated that it would
not "strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an
alleged illicit legislative motive," 135 subsequent cases have made it clear
that the Court has backed off from this approach. 136 Where the government's asserted interest is clearly a sham to hide impermissible content
discrimination or an otherwise illicit motive, the Court will not uphold
the regulation merely because, in theory, a neutral reason for it could be
imagined. 137 Because it is impossible to read the legislative history of the
LSC restrictions without coming to the conclusion that they were enacted

133 142 CONG. REC. H8149-04,8179 (daily ed. July 23, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Burton). Representative Weldon expressed a similar sentiment that the LSC was engaging
in unwelcome litigation. While the LSC recipients he had spoken with were doing "some
good things . .. representing people who are being unfairly evicted from their housing,
helping out the poor ... ," Representative Weldon reported that he "did get them [the
LSC lawyers] to acknowledge that there are LSC lawyers ... that engage in what I would
call public advocacy to basically thwart the will of the people." Id. at 8182 (statement of
Rep. Weldon).
134 See infra Part 111.A.3 (providing a more detailed discussion of the lack of tailoring
of the restrictions and the inferences that may thereby be raised of an intent to discriminate
based on content and speaker identity).
135 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968).
136 See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (striking down a Louisiana
statute requiring public schools to teach "creation science" whenever they taught evolution
because the requirement served no secular purpose); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S . 38 (1985)
(invalidating Alabama statute authorizing schools to set aside one minute at the start of
the school day for "meditation or voluntary prayer"); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980)
(holding unconstitutional a Kentucky statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments on the walls of each public classroom because the requirement served no secular
purpose).
137 See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 75 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("[A] legislature [might] enunciate a sham secular [purpose, but] our courts are capable
of distinguishing a sham secular purpose from a sincere one."); Cornelius v. NAACP, 473
U.S. 788, 833-34 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Everyone on the Court agrees that the
exclusion of 'advocacy' groups from the CFC is prohibited by the First Amendment if it
is motivated by a bias against the views of the excluded groups."); Board of Educ., Island
Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871 (1982) ("[W]hether
petitioners' removal of books from their school libraries denied respondents their First
Amendment rights depends upon the motivation behind petitioners' actions."); Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) ("In order for the state ... to
justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its
action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.").
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to cut off disfavored viewpoints, the restrictions fail the O 'Brien test, even
as incorporated into and softened by Rust.
2. The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine

If the regulations at issue in Rust had not permitted the recipients of
Title X funding to use other sources to fund their participation in the
excluded activities, the Court might have struck them down. Under the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, 138 the Court has consistently held
that the government may not require parties to forego their constitutional
rights altogether as a condition of receiving state funding or benefits.
Applying this doctrine, the two courts that have rendered decisions on the
LSC restrictions held the restrictions dealing with the use of non-federal
funds unconstitutional. 139 Although the LSC has revised its regulations on
the use of non-federal funds pursuant to those decisions, the following
discussion is included to complete the analysis in the event that Congress
should again attempt to regulate the use of non-federal funds.
The clearest statements of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in
the First Amendment context have come through the trilogy of cases,
Speiser v. Randall, 140 Perry v. Sindermann, 141 and FCC v. League of Women
Voters. 142 Speiser and Perry involved the explicit denial of a government
benefit to individuals engaged in unpopular speech, while League of Women
Voters dealt with the issue as applied to organizational speech.
In Speiser, California had conditioned eligibility for a property tax
exemption on avowing that one did not advocate the forcible overthrow
of the United States. The Court found that the denial of the exemption
would have the "effect of coercing the claimants to refrain from the
proscribed speech." 143 Because the condition was "frankly aimed at the
suppression of dangerous ideas," 144 the fact that the exemption could be
characterized as a privilege or bounty did not justify the restriction on
speech.
138 See generally Kathleen Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1413 n.l (1989) (reviewing and critiquing the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions). For
recent scholarship on the subject, see Frederick Schauer, Too Hard: Unconstitutional
Conditions and the Chimera of Constitutional Consistency, 72 DENY. U. L. REV. 989
(1995), and Martin H. Redish and Daryl I. Kessler, Government Subsidies and Free
Expression, 80 MINN. L. REV. 543 (1996) .
139 See Varshavsky v. Perales, No. 40767/9 l , slip op. at 16--19 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 24,
1996); Legal Aid Soc'y of Haw. v. Legal Servs. Corp., No. 97-00032, slip op. at 29 (D.
Hawaii Feb. 14, 1997) ("This smacks of an unconstitutional condition.") (all cases on file
with author) .
140 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
14 1 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
142 468 U.S. 364 (1984) .
143 357 U.S . at 519.

144/d.
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In Perry, the state Board of Regents fired a professor from his nontenured academic job because he made unflattering remarks about its
policies. The Court held in Perry that, even though a person does not have
a right to valuable government benefits, government entities may not deny
benefits "on a basis that infringes . . . constitutionally protected interests-especially ... freedom of speech." 145 As in Speiser, the fact that
the individual had no right to the benefit at issue, and that the government
was under no obligation to provide it, did not render the First Amendment
inquiry irrelevant.
League of Women Voters, in contrast to Speiser and Perry, involved
the assertion by an organization that it had been subjected to an unconstitutional condition. In League of Women Voters, Congress had prohibited
any recipient of a grant from the Public Broadcasting Corporation ("PBC")
from engaging in "editorializing." The prohibition extended not only to
the use of federal funds, but to all funds raised by the broadcasting
stations from any source. The Court found that the editorial speech targeted by the rule lay "at the heart of First Amendment protection," 146 and
that the government's stated purpose of preventing its entanglement with
propaganda could not sustain the expansive prohibition. While the federal
government could require that none of its funds be used for editorializing,
the Court held that a PBC recipient must be free to segregate its funds,
"to make known its views on matters of public importance through its
nonfederally funded, editorializing affiliate without losing federal grants
for its noneditorializing broadcast activities." 147
The LSC restrictions, as initially enacted, ran afoul of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in precisely the same manner as did the FCC
restrictions in League of Women Voters. The restrictions reached beyond
the use of federal funds to prevent LSC recipients from using funds
derived from any source to engage in the prohibited activities. Thus, in
its zeal to cut off the disfavored First Amendment activities being pursued
by LSC lawyers, Congress went too far.

145 Perry,

408 U.S. at 597.
of Women Voters , 468 U.S. at 381.
147 Id. at 400. Cf Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 432 U.S. 450 (1983)
('TWR" ) (discussed supra in text accompanying notes 105-110). The decision in TWR
involved Congress's decision not to grant tax-exempt status to organizations if a substantial
portion of their activities consisted of lobbying. Since the Court determined that the
government was under no obligation to fund such activities, it held that there had been no
imposition of an unconstitutional condition. After TWR and League of Women Voters,
otherwise tax-exempt organizations have avoided the restriction at issue in TWR by
creating separate lobbying organizations.
146 League
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3. Public Forum Analysis
This section argues that the restrictions on LSC run afoul of the First
Amendment not simply because they discriminate on the basis of the
content of speech, but because they are inconsistent with the very purpose
of the LSC program. In short, in contrast to the situation presented in Rust
v. Sullivan, there is a legitimate and recognized public forum at issue in
the case of the LSC.
The Court's view of the Title X program adopted in Rust allowed it
to conclude that abortion services could reasonably be excluded from the
program's scope. Since Congress had authorized a limited family planning
program, it was not obligated to support services beyond the program's
limits. This narrow construction of the program's scope was critical to the
Court's analysis. If the scope were more all-encompassing, both doctors
and patients participating in the program might have had a reasonable
expectation "of comprehensive medical advice." 148
While this caveat suggests the possibility that clients might be justified
in their expectation of comprehensive legal advice, 149 the more interesting
issue for the LSC case is the Court's careful distinction between the
nature of the Title X program and other institutions traditionally devoted
to First Amendment activity. If the government subsidy at issue was not
in the form of direct funding, but rather was "in the form of Government148 Rust

v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991).
LSC mandate is considerably broader than the Title X charter. Whereas Title
X was established specifically to address family planning needs (rather than, for example,
to provide comprehensive medical care to those in need), the LSC program was established
to provide equal access to the justice system for all Americans. While Congress never
intended to provide poor people with all the legal resources available to the wealthy, the
LSC mandate would have to be narrowed to make it consistent with the latest round of
restrictions, mocking its original purpose.
By directing funds to independently organized lawyers, the LSC also enmeshes itself
in the professional norms of lawyers and their Code of Professional Ethics. These ethical
rules require lawyers to provide the services they deem most appropriate to their clients'
needs: therefore LSC clients may have a reasonable expectation of comprehensive service,
unless the LSC restrictions are considered to override the Code. One of the cases
challenging the restrictions raised this apparent conflict between a lawyer's professional
obligations and the LSC restrictions, but no court has yet addressed the issue directly. See
Varshavsky v. Perales, No. 40767/91 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 24, 1996) (avoiding the resolution
of the alleged conflict because the court found that the LSC restrictions violated the First
Amendment); see also discussion supra note 25.
While it is beyond the scope of this Article, a full development of the argument that
the government may not be able to control its funds with exquisite specificity would be
worth exploring. For an interesting answer to some of these questions, see David Cole,
Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in GovernmentFunded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV . 675, 743-47 (1992) (arguing that the government
should be limited in its ability to control speech within traditional fiduciary relationships).
Part II.B .3 infra discusses the special status of the lawyer-client relationship in our
tradition and suggests that Congress's authority to attach limitations to funding in this area
should be highly restricted.
149 The
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owned property," the Court recognized that the subsidy alone would not
justify "the restriction of speech in areas that 'have been traditionally
open to the public for expressive activity' ... or 'have been expressly
dedicated to speech activity."' 150 Because the Title X program could not
be described as a forum traditionally or expressly dedicated to speech
activity, the Court concluded that the restrictions on speech affected by
the regulations were permissible.
The Court thus briefly invoked the "public forum" concept and found
that it did not apply. Although the Court's public forum jurisprudence is
notoriously confused, 151 at its core it is concerned with the relative importance of a particular space or institution to expressive activity. The
finding of a public forum can either raise or lower the level of scrutiny
applied to a restriction. 152 But once the Court has begun to analyze a
restriction in terms of its relationship to a public forum, it has already
taken a significant analytical step towards accepting that those seeking
access to the forum are engaged primarily in First Amendment activity
rather than non-expressive conduct. 153
In Rust, as discussed above, the Court did not engage in this analysis
because it did not consider the underlying activity to be sufficiently
"expressive" to meet the threshold question asked in its public forum
cases. 154 Since the Court characterized abortion counseling as speech incidental to the provision of family planning services, it was willing to
compromise abortion counseling in the name of the government's authority to determine which services to provide. In the case of the LSC restrictions, however, which are more easily characterized as targeting speech,
the Rust Court's method of analysis may be inappropriate.
150 Rust, 500 U.S. at 200 (quoting United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S . 720, 726
(1990)).
151 See, e.g., Cole, supra note 149, 718-19 (1992) (stating that the Court's public
forum cases have "generated one of the most confused and widely-criticized doctrines of
[F]irst [A]mendment law"). See also C. Thomas Dienes, The Trashing of the Public
Forum: Problems in First Amendment Analysis, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 109 (1986)
(criticizing the Court's public forum jurisprudence); Geoffrey Stone, Fora Americana:
Speech in Public Places, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 233 (same).
152 See Geoffrey Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 46, 91 (1987)
("[A]lthough it is clear that the Court applies different standards of review for public
forums and nonpublic forums, it is less clear precisely what standard it applies.").
153 See Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985) (holding that the threshold
issue that must be decided in applying a public forum analysis is whether the activity
allegedly excluded qualifies as "speech protected by the First Amendment, for, if it is not,
we need go no further").
154 Christina Wells has noted that the Court's "treatment of abortion counseling [in
Rust] as a form of activity rather than a form of speech" has much to do with its "emerging
view that abortion is no longer a fundamental right." Since the status of the activity
associated with the speech has gone down in the Court's conception of fundamental rights,
the speech has been afforded less protection. See Christina E. Wells, Abortion Counseling
as Vice Activity: the Free Speech Implications of Rust v. Sullivan and Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, 95 CoLUM. L. REV. 1724, 1725-26 (1995).
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Public forum analysis may ultimately contribute little to the outcome
of the LSC case. 155 Nevertheless, it is another prism through which to
view the restrictions, which takes seriously the First Amendment nature
of the prohibited activities while balancing them against the government's
interest in using its property-here, its money-in the manner it sees fit. 156

a. Establishing the Forum
The Court generally has recognized two types of public forums:
traditional public forums, such as streets and sidewalks, 157 and designated
public forums, such as school auditoriums, which the state has set aside
for expressive activity. 158 While restrictions on traditional public forums
are subject to strict scrutiny, 159 restrictions on the use of designated public
155 As Justice Kennedy noted in his separate opinion in Denver Area Educ. Telecomm.
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2413 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part), whether the Court finds a public
forum does not change the fact that "strict scrutiny is the baseline rule for reviewing any
content-based discrimination against speech. The purpose of forum analysis is to determine
whether, because of the property or medium where speech takes place, there should be
any dispensation from this rule.").
156 Forum analysis also takes into account the distinction that the Court has occasionally invoked between the government's speech and private speech funded by the government. In a nonpublic forum, the government controls the content of speech because the
property has been dedicated to the government's purposes. In a public forum, however,
private speakers are free to express their own views, even though they enjoy a government
subsidy in the form of the forum . See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833-34 (1995). The Court stated:

[W]e have permitted the government to regulate the content of what is or is not
expressed when it is the speaker or when it enlists private entities to convey its
own message .... [W]hen the government appropriates public funds to promote
a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it wishes .. . . It does not
follow, however ... that viewpoint-based restrictions are proper when the University [or in this case, the government] does not itself speak or subsidize
transmittal of a message it favors but instead expends funds to encourage a
diversity of views from private speakers.

Id.
157 See Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (holding that
"streets and parks .. . [have] . . . time out of mind . . . been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions").
158 See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(defining designated public fora as "public property which the State has opened for use
by the public as a place for expressive activity."). See also Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S.
788, 802 (1985) ("In addition to traditional public fora, a public forum may be created by
government designation of a place or channel of communication for use by the public at
large for assembly and speech, for use by certain speakers, or for the discussion of certain
subjects.").
159 See Perry Educ. Ass 'n, 460 U.S. at 45 ("In ... quintessential public forums, the
government may not prohibit all communicative activity. For the State to enforce a
content-based exclusion it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.").

1998)

A Challenge to the 1996 LSC Restrictions

133

forums are subject to less searching review, unless the state has designated
an "unlimited" public forum. Restrictions on the use of limited designated
public forums are permissible so long as they are consistent with the
stated purposes of the forum and are viewpoint neutral. 160 Access to
nonpublic forums, such as government property that has not been designated
for expressive activity, may be denied by the government at its discretion,
so long as distinctions are not made on the basis of viewpoint. 161 In recent
years, the Court has recognized that even non-tangible property, such as
a pool of funding, may be considered a "metaphysical forum" and therefore
is subject to the restrictions associated with that status. 162
Traditional public forums are relatively easily identified. 163 To determine whether the state has created a designated public forum, however,
the Supreme Court held that it will look at the intent of the state actor
creating the forum, and at the nature of the forum itself. In Cornelius v.
NAACP, the Court stated, "[ w]e will not find that a public forum has been
created in the face of clear evidence of a contrary intent . . . nor will we
infer that the government intended to create a public forum when the

160 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 ("Once it has opened a limited forum ... the
State must respect the lawful boundaries it has itself set. The State may not exclude speech
where its distinction is not 'reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum."')
(internal citations omitted).
161 The Court in Perry Educ. Ass 'n stated:

Implicit in the concept of the nonpublic forum is the right to make distinctions
in access on the basis of subject matter and speaker identity. These distinctions
may be impermissible in a public forum but are inherent and inescapable in the
process of limiting a nonpublic forum to activities compatible with the intended
purpose of the property. The touchstone for evaluating these distinctions is
whether they are reasonable in light of the purpose which the forum at issue
serves.

Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 49.
162 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830 ("The SAF [Student Activities Fund] is a forum
more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense, but the same principles are
applicable."). The Rosenberger rationale has been picked up in at least three lower court
decisions since it was handed down, two involving public funding rather than physical
spaces. For example, in Church on the Rock v. City of Albuquerque, 84 F.3d 1273 (10th
Cir. 1996), the Tenth Circuit applied Rosenberger to invalidate a city's policy prohibiting
sectarian instruction and religious worship in city-owned senior centers, holding that the
policy constituted impermissible viewpoint rather than content-based discrimination within
a designated public forum. In Gay Lesbian Bisexual Alliance v. Sessions, 917 F. Supp.
1548 (M.D. Ala. 1996), the Alabama district court similarly invalidated a statute prohibiting any college or university from spending public funds on or allowing the use of
facilities by any organization promoting homosexual lifestyles. In Finley v. National
Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1996), the Ninth Circuit applied
Rosenberger in the context of funding for the arts, holding that discrimination based on
viewpoint was impermissible because of the vital role that the arts, like universities, play
in our democracy.
163 These are the places that have "time out of mind" been dedicated to speech activity.
See Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
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nature of the property is inconsistent with expressive activity." 164 In Cornelius, the Court examined the government's policy and practice in creating the Combined Federal Campaign ("CFC"), and determined that there
had been no intent to create a public forum for solicitation. Rather,
ironically, the Court found that the CFC had been created to "minimize
the disruption to the workplace that had resulted from unlimited ad hoc
solicitation activities by lessening the amount of expressive activity occurring on federal property." 165 Since there had been no intent to create a
public forum, the Court would not infer the creation of one. 166
In Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association, 167 the Court similarly refused to find the creation of a public forum
in a school district mail system. "If by policy or by practice the Perry
School District ha[d] opened its mail system for indiscriminate use by the
general public,'' 168 then, in the Court's view, there might have been a
plausible argument that a public forum had been created. Because the
school had only selectively allowed outside groups access to the mail
system, however, no public forum had been established, and no particular
organization could claim a right of access to a system that had been
lawfully dedicated to "facilitate internal communication of school-related
matters to the teachers." 169
In Perry, the Court specifically declined to find the creation of a
limited public forum. Recognizing the possibility that such a forum could
exist, the Court in dictum suggested that if a limited forum were to have
been created, an organization's right to access the forum would turn on
whether it was the type of organization for which the forum had been
created. "[E]ven if we assume that by granting access to the Cub Scouts,
YMCA's, [sic] and parochial schools, the School District ha[d] created a
'limited' public forum, the constitutional right of access would in any
event extend only to other entities of similar character." 170 Although other
"organizations that engage in activities of interest and educational relevance to students" 171 might then have a right of access, the plaintiffs in
Perry, who were "concerned with the terms and conditions of teacher
employment" 172 would not.

1

64473 U.S. 788, 803.
Id. at 805.
166 See id. ("That [First Amendment] activity occurs in the context of the forum created
does not imply that the forum thereby becomes a public forum for First Amendment
purposes.").
161 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
168 Id. at 47 .
169 Id.
170
Id. at 48.
111Id.
172 Id.
165
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Considered together, Perry and Cornelius instruct that the Court will
not find the creation of even a limited forum unless the government has
created one by explicit statement, practice, or policy. Moreover, the right
of access to a limited forum depends on its designated purpose. An
individual asserting a right of access to a forum therefore first must point
to evidence of the creation of a public forum. Second, if the forum is of
limited character, the individual must demonstrate either that he or she is
"like" those who have been granted access or that, to the extent that he
or she is unlike those granted access, the distinction is an impermissible
basis for exclusion.
The Court has taken up these themes in its subsequent cases discussing the creation of a limited public forum. In Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free School District, 173 Widmar v. Vincent, 174 and Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 175 the Court
addressed the creation of a limited public forum in, respectively, a school
district's program making school facilities available to community organizations, a university's program making empty classrooms available to
student groups, and a university's student activities fund. In these cases,
relevant factors for the Court's determination of whether a public forum
had been created included the schools' written policies and their ongoing
practices. In each case, the Court found that there had been an impermissible exclusion from the forum.
In Rosenberger, the Court analyzed the University of Virginia's prohibition on the distribution of funds to religious organizations in terms of
the general purposes of the student activities fund ("SAF") established by
the University Guidelines, which contained the prohibition. The fact that
the prohibition may have been in place since the inception of the program
did not bar the Court's conclusion that the prohibition was inconsistent
with the program's overall purpose of "support[ing] a broad range of
extracurricular student activities that are 'related to the educational purpose of the University."' 176 Since the Court believed that the prohibition
singled out a particular viewpoint for discrimination, it was inconsistent
with the historical commitment of a university as an institution dedicated
to the free exchange of ideas, and the University of Virginia's specific
commitment in creating the SAF to fund all student organizations contributing to that exchange. 177

173 508

U.S . 384 (1993).
174 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
11s515 U.S. 819 (1995).
176 /d. at 824 (quoting Appendix to Petition for Cert. at 61a).
177 See id. at 835 (noting that viewpoint discrimination is especially dangerous in the
context of a public university, "where the State acts against a background and tradition of
thought and experiment that is at the center of our intellectual and philosophic tradition").
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In Widmar v. Vincent, 178 which preceded Rosenberger by fourteen
years, the Court similarly held that a university could not prohibit religious groups from using its facilities once it had "created a forum generally
open for use by student groups." 179 Even if the university was not required
to create the forum in the first place, once it adopted a policy making
classrooms "generally open to the public," the university "assumed an
obligation to justify its discriminations and exclusions under applicable
constitutional norms." 180 The Court concluded that the university's regulations did not withstand strict scrutiny because the regulations discriminated against "forms of speech and association protected by the First
Amendment" 181 on the basis of the religious content of that speech. To
save its content-based exclusion, the university would have to show that
the exclusion "serve[d] a compelling state interest and that it [was] narrowly drawn to achieve that end." 182
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Mo riches Union Free School District, 183
decided after Widmar and before Rosenberger, stands for the same principle, although the Court in Lamb's Chapel never reached the question of
whether the school district had established a public forum. In Lamb's
Chapel, a school district had denied a church access to school premises
to show a religious film, although the district generally allowed the use
of its facilities for civic, recreational, and social purposes. The Court held
that the exclusion of religious groups constituted impermissible viewpoint
discrimination regardless of the status of the forum created or the school
district's intent. Although the district undeniably had the right to "preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is dedicated" 184
and was under no obligation to "permit[] after-hours use of its property
for any . . . uses," 185 the Court held that it could not single out religious
viewpoints for exclusion. Citing its other nonpublic forum cases, the
Court stated, "control over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on
subject matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are
reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint
neutral." 186 The distinction made by the school district was not viewpoint
neutral and thus was impermissible.
Although it did not treat them separately in its opinions, the Court's
determination in each case seemed to rest on two related concerns. First,
178 454

U.S . 263 (1981) .
Id. at 267.
180 Id. at 267-68.
181 Id. at 269 .
. 182 Id. at 270.
183 508 U.S . 384 (1993).
184 Id. at 390.
185 Id. at 39 l.
186 1d. at 392-93, (citing Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S . 788, 806 (1985) and Perry
Educ. Ass' n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass' n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983)).
179
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the Court determined whether the excluded organizations were "like"
those granted access. Second, the Court assessed the programs in light of
the important role institutions of public education have traditionally played
in American democracy. 187 Since, as the Court recognized in Rust v. Sullivan,
universities represent "a traditional sphere of free expression so fundamental to the functioning of our society that the Government's ability to
control speech within that sphere by means of conditions attached to the
expenditure of Government funds is restricted by the ... First Amendment," 188 the universities' exclusions were subject to heightened scrutiny.
Unlike the Combined Federal Campaign in Cornelius, or the school
mail system in Perry, or even the family planning clinics in Rust, institutions of public education are, in the Court's view, fundamental to the
well-being of our society. Whereas restrictions on speech within the confines
of more limited forums do not greatly threaten societal-wide harms, restrictions on speech within spheres expressly dedicated to First Amendment activity, such as the university, have the potential to undermine the
basic structure of our society. Connecting the two concerns described
above, the Court's limited public forum cases suggest that where the
institution seeking to impose a restriction is one that is inherently devoted
to First Amendment activity, the Court will assume that the institution's
ability to restrict or redefine 189 the forum is highly circumscribed. For
those few institutions that may be considered fundamental to the func187 Cf Board of Educ., Island Trees Sch. Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982)
(acknowledging that "public schools are vitally important in the preparation of individuals
for participation as citizens, and as vehicles for inculcating fundamental values necessary
to the maintenance of a democratic political system ...") (internal citations omitted).
188 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991).
189 If the government may continually redefine the scope of the program to exclude
restricted activities, then there will never be any basis for the argument that a given
restriction is inconsistent with the scope of the program. As scholars have noted in the
area of unconstitutional conditions, "[t]o decide whether a condition on funding makes a
recipient worse off, one must adopt some baseline from which to measure." Cole, supra
note 149, at 696 n.82 (citing Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term-Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 13 (1988) and Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative
Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1352-59 (1984)).
The problem with the Court's current approach to funding cases is that it "generally
articulates no independent baseline, and simply accepts the government's definition of the
benefit program as the baseline .. . . However, taken to extremes this approach would
allow government to avoid any unconstitutional condition by simply redefining its program." Cole, supra note 149 at 696 n.82. As in the unconstitutional conditions area,
restrictions attached to direct funding may never be deemed impermissible if there is no
limit to the government's ability to redefine the scope of a program each time it imposes
a new restriction. Some independent baseline must exist by which restrictions may be
evaluated. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374,
2413-14 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("If Government
has a freer hand to draw content-based distinctions in limiting a forum than in excluding
someone from it, the First Amendment would be a dead letter in designated public forums;
every exclusion could be recast as a limitation.").
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tioning of our society, even content-based exclusions such as those that
were upheld in Perry may be impermissible.
Where a government program supports expressive activity, even within
the confines of an institution not fundamental to the functioning of our
society, 190 the Court's public forum cases suggest that the relevant baseline
is not simply the initial charter of a program. Rather, the relevant provisions of a charter are those that define the scope and purpose of the
program in broad, constitutionally-permissible strokes. For example, allowing the facilities of a senior citizens center-an institution arguably
not fundamental to the functioning of our society-to be used by community groups only during specified hours should be viewed as a permissible restriction aimed at preserving the center's buildings and resources.
A declaration that all groups except those espousing a religious viewpoint
may use the facilities should be viewed as impermissible viewpoint discrimination, even if the exclusion were written into the initial rules authorizing the program. Although the center could claim that the purpose of
the program was to support non-religious activities during the specified
hours, the Court undeniably would find this purpose impermissible.
Where the institution supporting the expressive activity is itself fundamental to the functioning of our society, however, the government's
ability to limit access is properly viewed as even more restricted. The
Court in Rust acknowledged this principle when it distinguished family
planning clinics from public forums and universities. 191 Public forums and
universities have in common the near identity of their purposes with First
Amendment activity and the important role that each has played historically in the development of thought in our society. The presence of
government funding in these areas, while it is to be applauded to the
extent that it supports their traditional functions, becomes suspect when
it represents an attempt to displace traditional norms with a state-sponsored agenda. 192
190 The Court has yet to address the exact issue of what level of restrictions would be
permissible in a limited public forum operating within an institution not fundamental to
society. Each of the cases where the Court found the existence of a limited public forum
arose in the context of a school or university, which the Court clearly considers fundamental. Conversely, the Court held that there was no forum in each case suggesting the
presence of a limited public forum within a lesser institution. See, e.g., International Soc'y
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S . 672 (1992) (holding that an airport
terminal was not a public forum, even though First Amendment activity occurred therein,
because airports were neither historically nor expressly dedicated to First Amendment
activity). The logic of the Court's decisions in this area, however, suggests that if a forum
for expressive activity were recognized within an institution of lesser importance, such as
a senior citizens center, the standard of review should be higher than if there were no
forum, as in Rust, but less than where the institution is fundamental, as in Rosenberger.
19 1 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S . 173, 200 (1991).
192 As David Cole has argued, the "government cannot avoid [F]irst [A]mendment
scrutiny [in these areas] by arguing that it has no obligation to subsidize the exercise of
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The Court has never announced an exhaustive list of areas or institutions
deemed fundamental to the functioning of our society; rather, the Court
has chosen to identify such areas and institutions slowly over time.193 The
following section argues for the inclusion of legal services in this emerging list. Because legal representation, by tradition and by ongoing practice, constitutes core First Amendment activity that is critical to the functioning of our society, the government's ability to impose its norms in this
area, even as a condition of funding, should be highly restricted.
b. Application to the LSC Case
The LSC program should be viewed as a limited public forum because
it has been dedicated since its inception to core First Amendment activity,
namely the provision of legal advice and services. Congress created the
LSC a decade after the Supreme Court held in United States v. Button
that efforts to secure and act upon legal advice fall within constitutionally-protected freedoms. 194 The LSC represents an attempt to make those
freedoms meaningfully available to those who would otherwise be "unable
to afford adequate legal counsel," or to seek "redress of grievances." 195
Recognizing that "for many of our citizens, the availability of legal services
has reaffirmed faith in our government of laws," 196 Congress established
the LSC with a broad mandate to serve "the ends of justice." 197
constitutional rights." Cole, supra note 149, at 681. Even though the government funds
these areas by its own choice, First Amendment scrutiny applies because "each of these
institutions plays a central role in shaping and contributing to public debate, and because
the internal functioning of each institution demands insulation from government content
control." Cole, supra note 149, at 682. Cole suggests that these critical institutions should
be considered "spheres of neutrality," or exceptions to the government's general authority
to control the use of its funds with specificity, on account of "the role of [these] particular
institutions in maintaining a rigorous and diverse public dialogue, and a free citizenry."
Cole, supra note 149, at 682.
193 David Cole has suggested that public forums, public universities, and the press are
most easily recognized as "spheres of neutrality" in light of the Court's decisions. Cole
has also applied his analysis to government funding for the arts and government-funded
counseling programs, arguing that these areas should similarly be deemed neutral. See
Cole, supra note 149, at 717-47 .
194 The House Report accompanying the Legal Service Corporation Act of 1974
explicitly invoked Button to explain that the restrictions contained within the bill should
be read so as to be consistent with the First Amendment and lawyers' professional
responsibilities to their clients. See H.R. REP. No. 93-247(1974), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3872, 3881 ("Pursuant to Supreme Court decisions (such as NMCP v.
Button) and in accordance with the general responsibilities of attorneys to their clients ...
the bill does not seek to prevent recipients and their employees from fully apprising the
client community of its legal rights and properly informing poor people about the merits
of prospective litigation.").
195 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1994) (indicating congressional findings and declaration of
purpose).
196 Id.
191 Id.
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The legislative history of the LSC provides ample evidence to meet the
standards announced in Cornelius for the creation of a designated public
forum. 198 The statute creating the program evidences an intent to dedicate
funds to what had already been declared by the Supreme Court to constitute
First Amendment activity. The nature of the property at issue-the funds
dedicated to legal services-is by definition consistent with expressive
activity, much as the student activities fund in Rosenberger was inherently
consistent with expressive activity on the university campus. The LSC
funds are unlike the school mail system in Perry that was created for one
purpose and then allegedly diverted toward expression. Rather, the LSC
funds were dedicated from the beginning to "encourag[ing] and promot[ing] the use of our institutions for the orderly redress of grievances
and as a means of securing worthwhile reform," 199 in recognition of the
fact that "justice is served far better and differences are settled more
rationally within the system than on the streets."200 Viewed in this light, the
LSC was thus conceived as a way to move poor people's grievances from
the streets, a public forum from time immemorial, to the courts.
Since its inception, the primary criterion for eligibility for LSC assistance has been income. 201 Individual LSC grantees have been free to
determine their own financial eligibility requirements within the limits of
the LSC Act and federal regulations.202 Although no individual in poverty
has a right to LSC assistance, 203 the forum created in the LSC fund has
been in principle open to all who are "alike" in that they are poor and in
need of legal representation. Like the student organizations in Rosenberger who had no right to the University of Virginia's Student Activities
Fund simply on account of being a student organization, individuals have
no right to LSC assistance simply by virtue of being poor. Nevertheless,
much like the student organizations in Rosenberger, individuals seeking
the assistance of LSC grantees have the right not to be excluded on an
impermissible basis, such as viewpoint. As the Supreme Court recognized
in Rosenberger, "[t]he government cannot justify viewpoint discrimination among private speakers on the economic fact of scarcity." 204 If there

198 See Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 802--03 (1985) (holding that a public forum
can be created only "by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse
... [on a property the nature of which is] consistent with expressive activity").
199 H.R. REP. No. 93-247(1974), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3872, 3881.
200 Id.
201 See id. (stating that "[c]lients' eligibility for legal assistance will essentially be
determined by their impoverished circumstances").
202 see LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT 5.
203 See Howard Gault Co. v. Tex. Rural Legal Aid, Inc., 615 F.Supp. 916, 936
(N.D.Tex. 1985), aff'd in part, rev 'd in part on other grounds, 848 F.2d 544 (5th Cir.
1988) (holding that the LSC Act "does not create in an indigent any right to legal services
which is enforceable under Section 1983").
204 Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 835 (1995).
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are not sufficient funds to distribute among eligible recipients, "it [is]
incumbent on the state . . . to ration or allocate the scarce resources
[according to] some acceptable neutral principle." 205
The LSC statute has contained since its inception, however, exclusions that violate the principle for which Rosenberger has come to stand.
In an effort to maintain the strength of the LSC, Congress declared that
"the legal services program must be kept free from the influence of or use
by it of political pressures." 206 To effectuate the latter part of that concern,
Congress prohibited LSC grantees from participating in cases involving
desegregation, abortion, and military desertion. It also limited the ability
of LSC grantees to participate in class actions and lobbying activities. 207
But the fact that such restrictions were a part of the original LSC statute,
and in turn have been supplemented several times, is not proof of their
validity. As in Rosenberger, the general purposes of the LSC program may
require the invalidation of exclusions that indicate that the government
has misunderstood its responsibilities 208 or its limitations. Where a program has been expressly dedicated to First Amendment activity, and has
thereby been designated a public forum, any exclusions must be objectively "reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum," 209 not
simply necessary or desirable in the eyes of its creators.
In the case of the LSC, the public forum has been dedicated to those
First Amendment activities, recognized in Button, that are associated with
the provision of legal services. Restrictions placed on the LSC must
therefore be reasonable in light of the guiding purpose of the program.
To be sustainable under Rosenberger, content-based restrictions on LSC
grantees must be consistent with the general purpose of the program and
not represent hidden viewpoint discrimination. 210 Restrictions on LSC
grantees must therefore be analogous to limitations on a public university's funding for student organizations that state that no student periodicals whatsoever are eligible for funding. Some of the LSC restrictions
arguably fall into this latter category of regulation. However, the restrictions on class actions by LSC grantees and all political reform efforts
clearly do not. Viewed in light of their legislative history, these restrictions do not represent an attempt to allocate scarce funding according to
a neutral principle, but rather mark an effort to silence liberal viewpoints.
Id.
0642 u.s.c. § 2996(5) (1994).
207 See note 15, supra, describing the history of such restrictions.
208
In Rosenberger, for example, the University of Virginia defended its exclusion of
religious groups from the SAF on the grounds that it thought it was obligated to do so by
the Establishment Clause of the Constitution. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839-40.
209 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 806
( 1985)).
210 See id. (noting "viewpoint discrimination is presumed impermissible when directed
against speech otherwise within the forum's limitations").
20s
2
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As in Rosenberger, the fact that the LSC restrictions have been incorporated into the charter of the LSC program does not bootstrap them into
legitimacy.
The Court's viewpoint-discrimination jurisprudence thus would seem
to provide an adequate basis for invalidating the political LSC restrictions.
However, the second strain of the Court's school cases, which were discussed previously, suggests that restrictions on speech within fundamental
institutions such as universities are particularly dangerous. This reasoning
may provide additional support for the argument that even the "viewpointneutral" content restrictions attached to the LSC are constitutionally suspect. Just as the state, in creating a public university "acts against a
background and tradition of thought and experiment that is at the center
of our intellectual and philosophic tradition," 211 so too does Congress, in
creating and funding the LSC, act against the backdrop of legal representation in the Anglo-American tradition. The lawyer-client relationship
and the work product of the attorney 212 have long enjoyed a unique level
of protection in our system of justice. 213 Lawyers are subject to a Code
of Professional Responsibility, which requires them to exercise independent
judgment on behalf of their clients, regardless of who pays their legal
fees. 214 These traditions and professional responsibilities suggest that the
lawyer enjoys a special status in our system that should not be lightly
disregarded even as Congress asserts its right to control the programs it
funds.
When it created the LSC in 1974, Congress contemplated that the
Corporation would provide legal services for indigent clients consistent
with these traditions. The legislative record is replete with references to
the lawyers' Canon of Ethics and Code of Professional Responsibility, as
guideposts for LSC lawyers. 215 For example, the House Report accompa211

Id. at 835.
See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 512 (1947) ("[T]he general policy
against invading the privacy of an attorney's course of preparation is so well recognized
and so essential to an orderly working of our system of legal procedure that a burden rests
on the one who would invade that privacy ... .").
213 See, e.g., Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). The Court stated:
212

The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential
communications known to the common law. 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2290
(McNaughton rev. 1961). Its purpose is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public
interests in the observance of law and administration of justice. The privilege
recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends ....
Id.
214 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule l.8(f) (August 1983, as
Amended to February 1997); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR-5107(A), (B), EC 5-21, EC 5-22 (1983).
215 See H.R. REP. No. 93-247, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3872, 3880 ("[I]t is
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nying the 1974 Act explained that even the initial restrictions on political
reform efforts did not preclude lawyers from participating in such matters
in a representational capacity, where they felt that such efforts were
consistent with their ethical and professional obligations. 216 In short, Congress intended to create a program to provide poor people with lawyers
possessed of independent and professional judgment. As the House Report
stated, a choice of "how best to proceed in particular cases is always best
left to the attorney and client, and the Corporation should not seek to
substitute its judgment for that of the attorney in determining how best
to serve the interests of particular clients." 217
If Congress, in one legislative act, created a program to fund lawyers,
yet simultaneously limited their professional capabilities by barring certain subjects and legal activities, one wonders which half of the act
Congress intended to take precedence. If Congress was truly committed
to providing lawyers to poor people, then the restrictions on subject
matter seem inconsistent with this purpose. Introducing restrictions on the
lawyer's representational capacities, based solely on the source of the
funding, is inconsistent with every tradition and professional ethic dictating undivided loyalty to the client. 218 If the restrictions are of utmost
importance to Congress, then it would appear that Congress was not really
serious about providing lawyers to the LSC's intended beneficiaries. Rather,
the LSC program would become merely a paralegal or legal referral
service for poor people. Congress, however, is limited in its ability to
redefine a traditional profession by choosing to fund only certain aspects
of it. 219 Restrictions that are inconsistent with lawyers' traditional responsibilities should cede to the larger purpose of the program since it appears

expected that information about clients will be obtained solely through a simple form and
that eligibility will be determined in a manner that produces utmost trust and confidence
between attorney and client.").
216 See id. (analyzing the Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974 § 6d(4)).
217 /d. (analyzing the Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974 § 7(7)).
218 In the criminal defense context, the Court has noted that a lawyer paid by the
government to represent indigent clients "retains all of the essential attributes of a private
attorney, including, most importantly, his 'professional independence,' which the State is
constitutionally obliged to respect." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 50 (1988). Distinguishing
the legal profession from the medical profession, for example, the Court noted that "[i]n
contrast to the public defender, [the doctor's] professional and ethical obligation to make
independent medical judgments did not set him in conflict with the State . .. ." Id. at 51;
cf Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S . 312, 318-19 (1981) (explaining the role of a public
defender). Although criminal defense is different from civil representation, Dodson and
West stand for the principle that a lawyer's professional responsibilities are fundamentally
different from those of members of the other professions, and may inherently require
opposing the state's interests.
219 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991) (raising but not resolving the
question that it "could be argued . . . that traditional relationships such as that between
doctor and patient should enjoy protection under the First Amendment from Government
regulation, even when subsidized by the Government").
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from the legislative record that Congress believed it was creating a program to provide lawyers to poor people.
More important than any overriding congressional purpose is the fact
that the limitations undermine the integrity of an institution that is fundamental to the functioning of our society. Like the public university, the
untrammeled lawyer-client relationship is critical to the health of our legal
system and our political democracy. Button highlighted the important First
Amendment content of the lawyer-client relationship; this relationship,
however, enjoyed protection long before Button because of the "broad[]
public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice." 220
To the extent that the government becomes involved in regulating the
types of cases lawyers may assist their clients with, or which procedural
devices they may employ, the relationship between lawyer and client
becomes tainted by government influence.
Although the concrete harm in each individual case where a client is
referred to a non-LSC legal organization for assistance may be difficult
to identify, the cumulative effect of allowing the government to effectively
redefine the lawyer-client relationship suggests a problem of societal proportion. In the LSC context, as in the public university setting, the government may choose not to fund "fundamental" institutions. But once it
does, it should not meddle with the institution's internal workings. Certain
spheres are simply too important to allow the government to "buy up" in
exchange for the control that generally comes with ownership. In the case
of the LSC restrictions, a unique bundle of individual rights and societal
interests are threatened. These include the First Amendment rights of the
LSC lawyers and their clients, and the societal interest in preserving the
integrity of the lawyer-client relationship.
III. The LSC Restrictions Violate the Equal Protection Component of
the Due Process Clause
The LSC restrictions also raise a number of concerns under the equal
protection component of the Constitution. The speech suppressed by the
restrictions is undeniably connected to a disfavored group in our societythe poor. The restrictions reflect a desire on the part of Congress not only
to not hear from the poor and their advocates, but also to keep them out
of court. The restrictions reflect a bias on the part of Congress against the
poor and they impinge on the fundamental right of access to the courts.
This section will analyze the LSC restrictions in light of the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause, as an alternative basis on
which the restrictions may be deemed unconstitutional.
220 Upjohn

Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 , 389 (1981).
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A. The LSC Restrictions Represent Invidious Bias

Under traditional equal protection analysis, only those regulations
that single out a group of people based on race, religion, national origin,
or gender are subject to heightened scrutiny. 221 Those that single out the
poor as a group for disparate treatment are subject to mere rational basis
review, 222 such that the government must demonstrate only "that the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest." 223 Particularly in
matters of social and economic regulation, the Court will generally grant
legislatures "wide latitude" to exercise their judgment, presuming that
"even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic
processes." 224
1. The Poor

Although rational basis review is highly deferential, it is not entirely
without bite. In several important cases affecting the poor, the Court
found that the state failed to carry the admittedly light burden imposed
by rational basis review. In the context of criminal law, for example, the
Court has struck down statutes effectively imposing differential prison
sentences based on wealth 225 or differential liability for the expenses of
providing counsel. 226 The Court also has required states to provide trial
221 Legislative classifications based on race, religion, or national origin are subject to
the highest level of scrutiny, strict scrutiny, because "these factors are so seldom relevant
to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy-a view that those in the burdened
class are not as worthy or deserving as others." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1967) (examining
classifications based on race); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963) (analyzing
classifications based on religion); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886)
(discussing national origin). Legislative classifications based on gender are subject to an
intermediate level of scrutiny, in recognition ·of the fact that gender "generally provides
no sensible ground for differential treatment." Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 440. See,
e.g., United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2275-76 (1996) (applying intermediate
review standard to strike down the Virginia Military Institute's policy of excluding
women); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (announcing intermediate review standard).
222 See, e.g., San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18 (1973) (applying
low level standard of review to school financing scheme that discriminated against the
poor); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-74 (1972) (applying rational basis review to
state's summary eviction procedures); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970)
(applying rational basis review to state's imposition of an upper limit on its cash assistance
to families).
223 Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 440.
224 /d.
225 See Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 242-45 (1970) (striking down state statute
allowing for imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum period where the imprisoned
individual was unable to pay an assessed fine or court costs).
226 See James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 141-42 (1972) (striking down a statute
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transcripts for indigent defendants appealing their criminal convictions227
and counsel in a first appeal of right. 228
While the restrictions at issue in these cases generally implicated the
fundamental liberty interests of the poor and were therefore subject to
even more searching review under the Equal Protection Clause, 229 the
wealth-based distinctions also were analyzed in terms of rational basis
review. In James v. Strange, for example, where the regulation at issue
did not impair the liberty interests of indigent defendants, but rather
subjected them to heightened liability for the cost of counsel, the Court
found that the classification employed was irrational. Recognizing that
"state recoupment statutes may betoken legitimate state interests," 230 the
Court nevertheless found that those interests could not justify the distinction made between "indigent criminal defendants" and "other classes of
debtors." 231 Because the state's recoupment statute put the indigent defendant uniquely at risk of losing "the means needed to keep himself and his
family afloat," 232 the Court held that it "embodie[d] elements of punitiveness and discrimination which violate the rights of citizens to equal
treatment under the law." 233

2. Other Non-Suspect Classes
The Court has also applied rational basis review to strike down
classifications in other contexts where the poor were not affected. As in
Strange, the Court has suspected in these cases the presence of punitiveness and discrimination that violate the spirit of equal protection. In
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 234 City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, 235 and, most recently, Romer v. Evans, 236 the
Supreme Court held unconstitutional legislative enactments that could not
be explained in terms of anything other than invidious bias. 237 Because

imposing liability on indigent defendants for expenditures made by the state in the
provision of counsel).
221 See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
228 See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963).
229 See discussion infra Part III.B.
230 Strange, 407 U.S. at 141.
231 Id.
232 Id. at 136.
23 3Id. at 142.
234 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
235 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
236116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) .
237 Cass Sunstein has described these cases as the "Moreno-Cleburne-Romer trilogy,"
wherein the Court "ruled off-limits a constitutionally unacceptable 'animus' not involving
federalism or discrimination on the basis of race or sex." Cass Sunstein, Foreword:
Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 60 (1996).
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such bias could not be considered a legitimate governmental purpose, the
Court has held that the enactments failed under rational basis review.
In Moreno, the Court considered a subsection of the Food Stamp Act
that excluded from participation "any household containing an individual
who is unrelated to any other member of the household." 238 Searching for
a legitimate state purpose to sustain the exclusion, the Court found evidence in the legislative history only for the contention that the exclusion
was "intended to prevent so-called 'hippies' and 'hippie communes' from
participating in the food stamp program." 239
The Court rejected the government's assertion that the exclusion
served the additional purpose of minimizing fraud in the administration
of the food stamp program. It noted that the Act elsewhere contained
specific provisions addressing fraud, and found that the denial of food to
households containing unrelated individuals represented an irrationally
overbroad response to the problem posed by these particular households,
and an underinclusive response to fraud generally. Concluding that there
was no plausible justification for the exclusion, the Court struck it down.
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, announced a principle that would
be applied in later cases finding invidious bias: "if the constitutional
conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at
the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest."240
In Cleburne Living Center, the Court considered the constitutionality
of a city's requirement that operators of a group home for the mentally
retarded obtain a special use permit. Finding that the requirement had
been imposed solely out of fear of the mentally retarded, the Court held
that the requirement could not survive rational basis review. As in Moreno,
the Court searched the record for some "rational basis for believing that
the [group] home would pose any special threat to the city's legitimate
interests." 241 The Court considered the city's various arguments regarding
"fire hazards, the serenity of the neighborhood, and the avoidance of
danger to other residents," 242 but found that such concerns could not
justify the singling out of this particular home. While the city's expressed
concerns may have been legitimate, its imposition of the special permit
requirement on the group home for the retarded, without imposing a
similar requirement on other structures and dwellings threatening similar
harms, was irrational. As the Court concluded, "[t]he short of it is that

238

Moreno, 413 U.S. at 529.
/d. at 534.
240 Id.
241 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985).
242 Id. at 450.
239
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requiring the permit in this case appears to us to rest on an irrational
prejudice against the mentally retarded ...." 243
Romer applied this intuition to the highly unusual case of a state
referendum, Colorado's Amendment 2, prohibiting all legislative, executive, or judicial action designed to protect homosexuals from discrimination. Although homosexuals, like the poor and the mentally retarded, are
not a suspect class for the purposes of equal protection analysis, the Court
nevertheless found the referendum unconstitutional. Applying rational basis review, the Court again found that the action was motivated by invidious bias against an unpopular group.
Analyzing the referendum against the backdrop of the state's asserted
objectives of respecting "other citizens' freedom of association-in particular the liberties of landlords or employers who have personal or religious objections to homosexuality,'' 244 as well as the state's interest "in
conserving resources to fight discrimination against other groups" 245-the
Court found a fatal disconnect. The referendum was "at once too narrow
and too broad" 246 to have been genuinely conceived as an effort to further
these interests, since "[i]t identifies persons by a single trait and then
denies them protection across the board." 247 The discontinuity of the
referendum with the state's asserted interests raised the inference that it
was "inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects," 248
and that the measure therefore lacked "a rational relationship to legitimate
state interests." 249
The rational basis standard that emerges from Moreno, Cleburne
Living Center, and Romer is thus one that has considerably more bite than
the standard applied in "the ordinary case, [where] a law will be sustained
if it can be said to advance a legitimate government interest, even if the
law seems unwise or works to the disadvantage of a particular group, or
if the rationale for it seems tenuous." 250 Where the Court suspects that the
classification is "drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law," 251 it will not be sustained. Moreno thus established and
Romer confirmed that sheer dislike for an unpopular group is not a legitimate
basis for discriminatory state action.

243 Id.
244 Romer

v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629 (1996).
mid.
246 Id. at 1628.
241 Id.
248 Id. at 1627.
249 Id.
250 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627 (distinguishing other "ordinary" cases where rational
basis test was met).
251 Id.
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3. Application to the LSC Case
The LSC restrictions were motivated by precisely the kind of invidious bias that Moreno, Cleburne Living Center, and Romer pronounce
illegitimate. Viewed in light of their legislative history, there is no question that the restrictions represent an attempt to cut off unpopular viewpoints and to silence the trouble-making poor. Congressional debate on
the restrictions revealed an intense dislike on the part of several Members
for the types of cases brought by LSC lawyers, particularly those that
could be described as "liberal."252 New York State Justice Beverly Cohen
noted in her opinion striking down the restrictions that the legislative
history "reveals that the actual state interest in passing the legislation was
a blatant attempt to inhibit the First Amendment rights of LSC lawyers,
their clients, and anyone who agrees with them. The restrictions were
designed to minimize, if not prevent, the political impact of the causes of
the poor and their champions." 253 As in Cleburne Living Center, the LSC
restrictions reflect desires on the part of Congress not to hear from the
poor and not to be disturbed by their presence.
In its court papers defending the restrictions, the government has
relied on Rust v. Sullivan to assert its right not to "subsidize certain
activities," and to exercise "control over programs it creates and subsidizes."254 No other state interest has been represented. Under Rust, the
government argues, Congress can choose which activities it wishes to
fund, and which it wishes to exclude. According to the defenders of the
restrictions, Congress's wish to "restore the LSC to its original focus on
the bread and butter needs of the poor" 255 is a legitimate rationale for
removing class actions and other types of political action from the purview of LSC recipients.
As discussed in Part II supra, however, Rust may not be controlling
in this case. Insofar as the provision of legal services is significantly
different from the provision of family planning services, the former inherently implicating core First Amendment rights, the restrictions may not
be constitutionally or statutorily permissible even if the state's asserted
interests are taken at face value.

252 See 142 CONG. REC. H8185 (daily ed. July 23, 1996) (statement of Rep. Doman).
Representative Doman declared, "It's time to defund the left . . . ." Id. at H8 I 85.
253 Varshavsky v. Perales, No. 40767/91, slip op. at 14-15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 24,
1996).
254 Govemment's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion for Preliminary
Injunction and for Class Certification at 13, Velasquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., (No. 97 CV
00182) (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 1997).
255 Defendants' Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion for
Preliminary Injunction at 6, Velasquez v. Legal Servs. Corp. (No. 97 CV 00182) (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 21, 1997).
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However, once the state's asserted interests are closely examined,
these interests become even more suspect. As in Romer, the restrictions
are at once too broad and too narrow to achieve their stated goals. In an
alleged effort to stop what it considers frivolous or non-essential litigation
and political activity, Congress has denied a wide panoply of legal tools
across the board to LSC recipients. Rather than, for example, requiring
recipients to certify that there is a good faith basis for all actions undertaken, Congress has substituted its own judgment that, in all cases, class
actions and political activity will never be the most effective or efficient
means available. 256
The restrictions are both too broad and too narrow. They deny effective relief where the excluded activities might in fact be the most effective
means to address the "bread and butter needs" of poor people, and they
are too narrow because they fail to address instances of abuse where none
of the excluded tools are utilized. Such a discrepancy between the asserted
goals and the actual effect of the restrictions suggests that Congress was
not concerned about refocusing the LSC on the basic needs of the poor.
Rather, the lack of fit suggests that Congress was attempting to suppress
a distinctive political agenda, espoused by many LSC lawyers and their
clients. As Moreno, Cleburne Living Center, and Romer instruct, such
bare dislike for an unpopular group is an impermissible basis for a legislative classification, even if the government is under no general obligation
to provide the benefit in question. 257

256 As two observers of the ongoing Congressional effort to limit the activities of LSC
lawyers have noted: "If the Legal Services lawyers act improperly, the local program, the
court, and the LSC all have sanction mechanisms." Marie A. Failinger & Larry May,
Litigating Against Poverty: Legal Services and Group Representation, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. l,
55 (1984). In light of such existing sanction mechanisms, the broad-based exclusions
included in the 1996 restrictions are difficult to justify on the grounds that they will
prevent abusive lawyering.
257 As Justice O'Connor, writing for a majority of the Court, recognized in Cornelius
v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788 (1985), a significantmisfit between the state's asserted goals and
its actions can give rise to an inference that the state has misrepresented its actual
purposes. In Cornelius, certain organizations including the NAACP had been excluded
from participation in the Combined Federal Campaign ("CFC"), a federal program for
charitable giving open to all federal workers. Although the government asserted that it had
excluded all advocacy organizations in order to avoid controversy, and that it had included
only those organizations that provided direct health and welfare services, the Court noted
that other organizations that did not provide such direct services had been included. The
Court found that this discrepancy "cast doubt" on the genuineness of the government's
asserted objectives, and invited the plaintiff organizations to develop on remand their
argument that their exclusion "was impermissibly motivated by a desire to suppress a
particular point of view." Id. at 812-13. See also Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422
U.S . 205 (1975); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); and Martin v.
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (all finding underinclusiveness indicative of an impermissible motive).
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B. The Restrictions Impinge upon LSC's Clients' Fundamental Right of
Access to the Courts
In addition to representing an invidious bias against the poor, the restrictions are invalid under the Equal Protection Clause because they impinge
upon LSC clients' fundamental right of access to the courts. 258 Access to
the courts is not only fundamental as a First Amendment right, but also
as a right preservative of all other rights. 259 If the poor do not have access
to the courts to enforce rights obtained in the legislative arena, those
rights are effectively meaningless. More importantly, in light of the invidious bias cases, if legislative acts violate the constitutional rights of
the poor, access to the court may provide the only means of redress.
As Justice Stone wrote in his famous footnote 4 to United States v.
Carolene Products,26() "searching judicial inquiry" may be appropriate
where a regulation "tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities." 261
258 Which rights are fundamental for the purposes of equal protection analysis are
hardly fixed and precise. Statutory schemes impinging upon the right of poor people to
travel, vote, or obtain a divorce, for example, have been invalidated as denials of equal
protection on the grounds that these rights, among others, are fundamental. See Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (invalidating law impinging on access to the courts to
obtain a divorce); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (addressing right to travel);
Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (invalidating Virginia law
imposing $1.50 poll tax). Although the Court has offered various formulations for
determining whether a right is fundamental , no single definition has emerged as determinative. See, e.g., Boddie, 401 U.S . at 374 (suggesting that the relevant inquiry is whether
the state has monopolized enforcement of a particular right); Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (suggesting that the relevant question is whether it would be possible
to imagine a "scheme of ordered liberty" without recognition of the right at issue as
fundamental) . See also Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access
Fees: The Right to Protect One 's Rights (pt. 1), 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1178-80 (discussing
the ambiguity in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on which rights are fundamental); Ira
C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981 ,
1007-08 (1979) (same).
259 The notion of preservative rights was introduced in reference to voting in Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) and developed in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
562 (1964). Moreover, as the Button Court recognized, access to the courts will be
critically important for those groups "unable to achieve their objectives through the ballot."
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963). Frank I. Michelman has written about the
connection between access to courts and the ballot:

[L]itigation and legislation . . . [are] bound up with one another in an entire,
political-legal order in which the court's part is no less critical than the legislature's . . . . Access to the courts and access to legislatures are [thus] claims that
merge into one another, .. . [and one] cannot, without confusion, call a person
a citizen and at the same time sanction . . . [his] exclusion . . . from that process.
Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect
One 's Rights (pt. 2), 1974 DUKE L.J. 527, 534-40.
260 304 U.S. 144 (1938) .
261 /d. at 153 n.4.
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Although the poor are not the kind of "discrete and insular minority" 262
contemplated by Justice Stone, legislative actions that threaten to undermine fatally the capacity of the poor or other non-suspect classes to
participate in the ·political processes have nevertheless been consistently
struck down.
The Court's poll tax and voting cases, for example, established that
the right to vote may not be conditioned on the basis of wealth.263 Similarly, the Court's ballot access and filing fee cases have held that a state
may not make it virtually impossible for new political parties to be placed
on the ballot, 264 or for poor people to run for office. 265 The logic of these
decisions reflects both a concern for the legitimacy of our political democracy and for the rights of minorities who are threatened with utter
disempowerment. As Justice Warren noted in Kramer v. Union Free School
District, "[a]ny unjustified discrimination in determining who may participate in political affairs or in the selection of public officials undermines the legitimacy of representative government." 266 Moreover, "[s]tatutes
granting the franchise to residents on a selective basis always pose the
danger of denying some citizens any effective voice in the governmental
affairs which substantially affect their lives." 267
Although it was not explicit, Justice Kennedy's opinion in Romer,
relied heavily on the Court's fundamental or preservative rights jurisprudence. In addition to finding that Colorado's Amendment 2 was motivated
by invidious bias against homosexuals, the Court concluded that the referendum had the peculiar effect of making it "more difficult for one group
of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government." 268
262 Id.
263 See

Phoenix v. Kolodziej ski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970) (invalidating Phoenix law
limiting the vote on the issuance of general obligation bonds to property-owning taxpayers); Cipriano v. City of Houston, 395 U.S. 701 (1969) (invalidating Louisiana law
extending the vote on municipal utility bonds issuance to property-owning taxpayers);
Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. , 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (invalidating New York statute
restricting voting in school district elections to those residents who owned or leased
taxable real property in the district or had a child enrolled in the local school); Harper v.
Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (invalidating Virginia law imposing
a $1.50 poll tax).
264 See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 , 25 (1968) (invalidating Ohio law making it
"virtually impossible for any party to qualify on the ballot except the Republican and
Democratic Parties"). Cf Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986); American Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974) (upholding state ballot access scheme);
Jenness v. Forston, 403 U.S. 431, 439 (1971) (upholding Georgia law placing some
additional burdens on new parties because in total , the state's ballot access scheme "in no
way freezes the status quo").
265 See Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S . 709 (1974) (invalidating, as applied to indigents,
California law requiring candidates for office to pay a filing fee equivalent to two percent
of the annual salary of that office) ; Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (invalidating
filing fee shifting costs of primary to candidates) .
266 Kramer, 395 U.S. at 626 (1969).
267 Id. at 626- 27 (emphasis added).
268 Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1628 (1996).
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This singling out of a disfavored group for differential treatment
represented "a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal
sense," 269 because it imposed burdens on homosexuals shared by no other
group of citizens. While other groups seeking protection from discrimination would need only petition the legislature for more favorable laws
(if they did not already enjoy such statutory protection), homosexuals
would face the additional burden of having first to succeed in passing a
state referendum repealing Amendment 2.
The Court held that Colorado could not take such a dramatic step to
make homosexuals, as a class, "stranger[s] to its laws," and thereby
"unequal to everyone else." 27 Citing Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v.
Ferguson, 211 the Court stated that "the Constitution neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens." 272 Because the Colorado referendum
effectively created classes among citizens, not simply in the suspect class
sense, but in the "caste" sense described in Plessy, 213 it was impermissible.
The referendum created a caste system by setting up rigid political barriers to one group's ability to enjoy the protections of law on an equal basis
with other groups. These barriers would perpetuate the inequality of that
group's status based on a single disfavored characteristic. 274
The LSC restrictions operate in a manner analogous to the restrictions in Cleburne Living Center and Romer because they go to the heart
of the First Amendment rights of the poor and their ability to participate
in the political-legal order.275 Similarly, in United States v. Button, the
Court struck down restrictions that prevented blacks from exercising what

°

269 Id.
270 Id.

at 1629.

21 1 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
272 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1623

(quoting Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
Harlan noted in his dissent to Plessy: "[I]n view of the Constitution, in the
eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There
is no caste here." Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559.
274 Sunstein captured the two related ways in which Colorado's Amendment 2 tended
to create a caste system based on sexual orientation. First, the Amendment reflected "a
desire to isolate and seal off members of a despised group whose characteristics are
thought to be in some sense contaminating or corrosive." Sunstein, supra note 237, at 62.
In other words, Amendment 2 created a symbolic wall around homosexuals, giving legal
imprimatur to the presumably straight majority of voters' wish to designate homosexuals
as "other." This wish to seal off an undesirable group was similarly responsible, in the
Court's opinion, for the City of Clebume's effort to prevent the mentally retarded from
entering their community. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432
(1985).
The second sense in which Amendment 2 attempted to establish a caste system was
in its creation of a "second-class citizenship" for homosexuals whereby it would be more
difficult for homosexuals than for any other group to obtain the protection of the laws.
See Sunstein, supra note 237, at 63 .
275 Cf Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 531, 600 (1994) ("Winning the battle in the courts rather than in the
legislatures does not violate democratic principles because the courts are intervening on
behalf of groups that are under-represented in the legislatures.") (summarizing DAVID
LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988)).
273 Justice
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was likely to be their most effective form of political expression. While
the LSC restrictions leave the private bar free to take up class actions and
political activity on behalf of the poor, the restrictions are likely to
diminish the total volume of such cases and activities. 276 Moreover, the
inability of LSC recipients to initiate class actions threatens to undermine
the effectiveness both of their representation of individual clients and of
the class actions that are ultimately brought by separate counsel. 277 By
dispersing clients among private lawyers and non-LSC organizations, the
restrictions take away the primary advantages the poor once had: LSC
lawyers' expertise in the needs of the poor and their ideal positioning to
know when a problem had risen to a "class" dimension. 278
Thus, like Colorado's Amendment 2, the LSC restrictions make it
more difficult for the poor to obtain effective redress for their grievances.
276 To date, there is no data by which to judge the actual effect of the restrictions on
the number of class actions and other actions taken on behalf of the poor. Existing studies
of the pro bono activities of private lawyers suggest that "although most lawyers donate
some free services, little of it involves the representation of indigents." Cramton, supra
note 275 , at 578 n.121.
277 On the importance of class actions for effective individual as well as group
representation, see Failinger & May, supra note 256, at 17. Failinger and May argue:

[T]he fact is that group representation devices such as class actions are often the
most effective way of representing an individual poor person . . . . The individual
lawsuit, which may restore some of the economic benefits lost by the poor person,
cannot remedy past and future harassment or restore the political balance of
power between the institution and the individual. By contrast, the class suit can
secure relief for the client that is not only longer-lasting but also broader-based.
Additionally, the publicity accompanying the class suit places more of a burden
on the welfare official to explain his or her conduct to supervisors and members
of the public . . . .

Id. See also Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 266 (1972) (recognizing that class
actions "may enhance the efficacy of private actions by permitting citizens to combine
their limited resources to achieve a more powerful litigation posture").
278 Although no comprehensive list of major LSC victories exists, many of this
century's most important cases leading to an expansion of the rights of the poor were
brought by LSC lawyers. Notable cases brought by LSC lawyers include Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (holding that the right to divorce is fundamental) ;
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that recipients of public assistance have
a right to a hearing prior to the termination of benefits); and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969) (holding that the right to travel is fundamental). See Allen Redlich, A
New Legal Services Agenda, 57 ALB. L. REV. 169, 169 n.4 (1993). The fact that such
important cases were brought by LSC lawyers suggests that specialization in poverty law
does add value to the service LSC lawyers are able to provide their indigent clients. See
Cramton, supra note 275, at 590. Cramton writes:
[T]he staff-attorney system [of legal services for the poor, in contrast with a
system which refers poor persons to members of the private bar] provides a cadre
of lawyers who are intellectually and personally committed to serving the poor.
The delivery of services may be organized so that clients are served by experienced specialists in various areas of poverty law, such as welfare, housing, or
education. Further, the staff-attorney system permits more aggressive pursuit of
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They are free to seek private representation in matters forbidden to LSCgrantees, just as homosexuals in Colorado would have been free to seek
vindication of their rights by campaigning for the repeal of Amendment
2. But at some point, the Supreme Court has said, the albatross placed
around the neck of a disfavored group, even if it is not a suspect class,
grows too large and offends our sense of fairness. While individuals with
sufficient resources may hire only one lawyer, impoverished clients must
seek the assistance of several lawyers to obtain effective relief. Yet, the
lawyers most likely to assist them in an effective manner have been placed
off limits.
The chilling of class actions and political activity that the restrictions
cause is particularly alarming because the doctrine of offensive collateral
estoppel does not apply to the federal government. In United States v.
Mendoza, 219 the Supreme Court held that "the United States may not be
collaterally estopped on an issue such as this, adjudicated against it in an
earlier lawsuit brought by a different party." 280 In Mendoza, a Filipino
national had applied for naturalization, building his case in part around a
constitutional challenge to the government's administration of the Nationality Act. This issue had been previously decided against the government
in a case brought by another Filipino national.
The Court found that the government could not be estopped from
relitigating the issue. "[B]ecause of the geographic breadth of Government litigation and also, most importantly, because of the nature of the
issues the Government litigates," 281 the Court held that estoppel was inappropriate. The Court suggested a variety of policy reasons, including
concerns about "thwart[ing] the development of important questions of
law by freezing the first final decision rendered on a particular legal
issue." 282 The Court declared that the government is simply "[u]nlike a
private litigant."283
Mendoza thus prevents an individual challenging a federal statute,
policy, or regulation from relying on a previous decision. Any person not
party to the previous decision must relitigate the issue, no matter how
many times a court has already decided a similar issue in their favor.
Under Mendoza, therefore, class actions may not only be the most efficient
institutional reform that benefits groups of poor people rather than merely an
individual client.
Id.
279 464

U.S. 154 (1984).
Id. at 155. Cf United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165, 169 (1984)
(holding that the government could be precluded from relitigating an issue "already
litigated against the same party in another case involving virtually identical facts") .
281 Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 159.
282 Id. at 160.
283 Id. at 161.
280
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and effective way to obtain relief for individuals with grievances against
the federal government, they may be essential. In a world of limited
resources, relitigating the same issue against the government is simply
impracticable. Mendoza thus creates enormous incentives for similarly
situated individuals to join as a class; if they are not party to the initial
litigation they may never obtain relief. Viewed in this light, the prohibition
on class actions seems particularly insidious, and the restrictions on lobbying and political activity deliver the final blow for real change. 284 As
Judge Cohen noted in Varshavsky: "The ostensible goal of saving money
will not be accomplished by relegating the poor to less efficient individual
actions for the same relief." 285 The goal of silencing disfavored views of
"unpopular individuals," 286 however, will be accomplished quite effectively.
Conclusion
The history of the Legal Services Corporation reflects recurrent good
and bad impulses in our society. Created in a gesture of optimism about
the potential for legal representation to improve the lot of the poor, since
its inception the LSC has been weighed down by restrictions, reflective
of the cultural wars of the day, which have undermined the ability of LSC
grantees to provide uncompromised legal services to their clients. These
restrictions generally have been enacted to placate opponents of the LSC
who, if they cannot defeat the Corporation entirely, are mollified by the
knowledge that it will undertake only "ham and eggs" work for poor
people. In addition, these restrictions have generally reflected a desire to
defund "liberal" causes, loosely defined as any unpopular effort on behalf
of the least favored in our society. While the 1996 restrictions specifically
284 As

Allen Redlich has noted:

[T]he need to provide a full range of quality legal services cannot be overstated.
Just as aspirin tablets and band-aids are not solutions to serious diseases and
serious injuries, steering the poor through the system and helping the cliem get
only what the system will allow is not a solution to poverty .... Whether the
legal services programs of America can increase the number of legal aspirin
tablets and band-aids they dispense is in the long run meaningless, unless the
programs have the ability and determination to do more. To ensure the poor
"access" to the legal system while limiting the ability of their lawyers to use the
law in a meaningful manner may make lawyers feel good about themselves and
the legal system, but, like a medical facility that dispenses only aspirin, this type
of program is of little societal value.
Redlich, supra note 278, at 174-75.
285 Varshavsky v. Perales, No. 40767/91, slip op. at 14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 24, 1996).
286 142 CONG. REC. H8182 (daily ed. July 23, 1996) (statement of Rep. Schiff)
(responding to the assertion by colleagues that "unpopular individuals have brought
unpopular lawsuits through the Legal Aid Society").
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target illegal aliens, drug users, and prisoners, prior restrictions have
prohibited the representation of military deserters and those seeking an
abortion, desegregation, or redistricting. A 1977 attempt to cut off LSC
funding for representation of homosexuals is notable not for its blatantly
discriminatory purpose, but rather for the fact that it failed. 287
A consistent theme behind the restrictions imposed on the LSC over
its life is that of Congress trying to control the classes of people that will
receive assistance for reasons unrelated to financial need or ability to
benefit from legal representation. The 1996 restrictions are merely the
latest wave in this effort; nevertheless, they are notable insofar as they
are the most sweeping to date, and they are the first to categorically place
all political activity beyond the scope of LSC lawyers. If ever there was
a time to make the case that the restrictions amount to impermissible
discrimination on the basis of the content of First Amendment activity, it
is now. As this Article has argued, Rust v. Sullivan need not be an impediment
to such a challenge. Other constitutional principles, such as the prohibition on content discrimination and the Court's public forum jurisprudence,
provide avenues by which to distinguish Rust.
For the poor person in our society, the need for an effective and
independent lawyer is particularly strong. Without such representation, the
poor will not be able to exercise their fundamental right of access to the
courts, a right all the more important where other means of participation
in the political-legal order are effectively unavailable. The right to uncompromised legal services is properly viewed as preservative of all other
rights for the LSC population, and should not be taken away lightly.
Although the current political climate favors the conditioning of public
assistance on a recipient's willingness to work or ability to meet other
requirements, this Article attempts to demonstrate how the provision of
legal services is qualitatively different from other types of public assistance. Without expressing a view on the moral or constitutional legitimacy
of recent revisions to the welfare system, this Article has suggested that
restrictions on legal services are uniquely corrosive of cherished constitutional freedoms and of the health and legitimacy of our democracy.
Thus, while current law does not require any public support for civil legal
services for the indigent, fairness and current law dictate that if such
services are provided, restrictions imposed on them may not discriminate
on the basis of viewpoint or fatally undermine the efforts of lawyers
seeking relief for their clients.

287 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 95-825 at 16 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4530, 4537 (reporting a legislative history of the Legal Services Corporation Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-222, 91 Stat. 1619 (1977). It reads : "Gay rights cases: The
House bill prohibits legal assistance with respect to any proceeding or litigation arising
out of disputes or controversies on the issue of homosexuality or 'so-called gay rights'.").
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At the time of this Article's completion, the 1997 budget battle is in
its intermediate stages. The LSC again faces major cuts, as Congressional
foes resurrect their enthusiasm for defunding it. 288 Those LSC lawyers
who said there was no deal in 1996 to save the Corporation appear to
have been correct. 289 The restrictions have not insulated the LSC from
continued assault. Regardless of the eventual budget for the LSC in the
coming year, the 1996 restrictions promise to remain in effect until they
are successfully challenged in court. This Article provides the groundwork
for such a challenge, a challenge that, of course, must be brought by
lawyers who are outside the Legal Services Corporation and therefore are
not subject to its restrictions.

288 See Jerry Gray, In Spending Bill, Gauntlet on Census is Thrown Down, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. l, 1997, at A23 (describing the tentative 1998 budget for the LSC as half of its 1997
budget). See also Richard W. Stevenson, Clinton and Congress in Accord On Budget,
Except for Tax Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1997, at Al (describing the earlier tentative
budget agreement reached between the White House and Congressional negotiators).
289 See supra note 23 .

